THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We are now on the record. This begins DVD No. 1 in the deposition of John Bruce Jessen in the matter of Salim versus James Elmer Mitchell and John Bruce Jessen in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Washington. Today is January 20th, 2017, and the time is 10:07 AM. This deposition is being taken at 130 North 18th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, at the request of Gibbons, PC. The videographer is Benjamin Neate of Magna Legal Services, and the court reporter is Connie Kent of Magna Legal Services. All counsel and parties present will be noted on the stenographic record. Will the court reporter please swear in the witness.
Andrew Warden: Good morning, I'm Andrew Warden from the US Department of Justice and I represent the United States Government. On behalf of the United States Government, I have with me here today Joseph Sweeney, attorney with the CIA Office of General Counsel, Cody Smith, an attorney with the CIA Office of General Counsel, Heather Walcott, an attorney with the CIA Office of General Counsel, Megan Beckman, paralegal with the CIA Office of the General Counsel, Antoinette Shiner, Information Review Officer with the CIA. And on behalf of the Department of Defense, Richard Hatch, an attorney with the DOD, Office of General Counsel, and Thomas Ellis, senior program analyst for the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. The United States Government is not a party to this case, but we are here today in order to represent the interests of the United States. We understand the questions in this deposition will cover topics related to Dr. Jessen's career with the Department of Defense and later as a contractor for the CIA. Given the sensitive nature of the positions that Dr. Jessen held with these agencies and the information he acquired with those positions, we are here today to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of classified, protected or privileged Government information. Prior to this deposition, the Government has provided the parties, plaintiffs and defendants, with classification guidance from the CIA and the Department of Defense. I believe it's marked as Exhibits 1 and 2 for the record. I have copies here. Additional copies.
Cody Smith: Are these, Mr. Warden, the same documents we marked as 1 and 2 at Dr. Mitchell's deposition?
Andrew Warden: Yes, they are.
Cody Smith: Madam Court Reporter, did you bring the exhibits?
THE REPORTER: I did.
Cody Smith: Maybe we can get them out and save some time.
Andrew Warden: Okay. So marked as Exhibit 1 is the classification guidance from the CIA. It's marked as US Bates numbers 22 to 24, with production date of May 20, 2016. It provides a list of categories of information about the CIA's former detention and interrogation program that remains classified and a list of categories of information about the program that's now unclassified. Exhibit 2 is the Department of Defense guidance. It's marked as US Bates Nos. 2169 through 2170, with a production date of January 14, 2017. It provides a list of categories of information about DOD's Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape program that remains classified, and a list of categories of information about that program that is now unclassified. At the outset, we would issue an instruction to the witness, Dr. Jessen, that in response to any question, the Government instructs the witness not to answer by reference to any of the information identified as classified in the guidance that we have provided, and we will reserve our right to object to any question posed to Dr. Jessen, and consistent with his nondisclosure agreements with the Government, instruct Dr. Jessen not to answer any questions that would tend to call for disclosure of classified, protected or privileged Government information.
Cody Smith: Anything else, Mr. Warden?
Andrew Warden: That is all from me.
Cody Smith: So just so we're clear, we're following the same rules and agreements that we reached prior to the commencement of Dr. Mitchell's deposition.
Mr. Lavin: That's right.
Cody Smith: Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Lavin: All right. Good morning, Dr. Jessen. My name is Dror Lavin. I'm an attorney with the ACLU. Here with me are my colleagues, Larry Lustberg, Kate Janukowicz, Hina Shamsi, Steven Watt, Avi Frey and Dan McGrady. We represent plaintiffs in the matter of Salim v. Mitchell, Civil Action No. 15-286 in the Eastern District of Washington in which you are a named defendant. You are represented by counsel today, and I'm sure you've been prepared, but just so we're clear, I'll go through some instructions as to how the deposition is going to work. As you see, we have a stenographer and she's going to transcribe everything that's said today. We also have a videographer who will be recording your testimony. If this case goes to trial in the future, your testimony could be introduced through the transcript or video. Do you understand that?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Thank you. I'm going to be asking the questions today and you'll be providing responses. Your responses are under oath and you should treat it just as if you were testifying in court. It's the same oath that would apply even though we're in a less formal setting. Do you understand that?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Your attorney, Mr. Smith, will be defending you, and if he has any objections, he will state those, and if he does, please wait until his objection is finished before you respond. Do you understand that?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Also, please wait until I'm finished asking questions before you respond. I'll extent the same courtesy to you. It's important that we not speak over one another. If you don't understand a question or any part of a question, please ask me to rephrase it and I'll be glad to do so. Does that make sense?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: I will ask you to verbalize your answers because nods or gestures won't show up on the transcript. Are you on any drugs or medications today that would impair your ability to answer questions truthfully and accurately today?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: And you can take a break at any time. Just let me know if you need to do so. I will ask that if there's a question pending, you answer that question before we take a break, but otherwise, please feel free to just let me know if you need a break for any reason. If you answer a question, I will assume that you understood it and gave a truthful response. Is that fair?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: All right. Have you ever been deposed before?
John Bruce Jessen: Once.
Mr. Lavin: What was the general nature of that action?
John Bruce Jessen: I was deposed in relation to a homicide that took place in a military hospital.
Mr. Lavin: And just just returning to this deposition, did you discuss your testimony here today with anyone besides your attorneys?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Thank you. So I understand you you have a Ph.D. from Utah State; is that correct?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: What is that Ph.D. in?
John Bruce Jessen: Applied clinical psychology.
Mr. Lavin: And did you focus on anything in the course of your Ph.D.?
John Bruce Jessen: Applied clinical psychology.
Mr. Lavin: And what does that mean?
John Bruce Jessen: It's an accredited Ph.D. program that allows you to sit for licensure as a clinical psychologist.
Mr. Lavin: Is there any distinction between applied clinical psychology and other forms of clinical psychology?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: In the course of that Ph.D., did you have any course work on trauma?
John Bruce Jessen: What specifically do you mean by trauma?
Mr. Lavin: Well, do you understand the word trauma to mean something in the context of psychology?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: What do you understand it to mean?
John Bruce Jessen: I believe there are multiple ways you can experience trauma, I just don't know what you're talking about.
Mr. Lavin: Well, have you ever studied the way people respond to, for example, a traumatic experience?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Did you study that in the course of your Ph.D.?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Did you ever study posttraumatic stress disorder?
John Bruce Jessen: I have studied it or I've familiarized myself with it, but I don't I'm not certain, but I don't believe that term even existed when I was in school.
Mr. Lavin: I see.
John Bruce Jessen: I think it was called battle fatigue or something like that.
Mr. Lavin: I see. And did you study battle fatigue when you were in school?
John Bruce Jessen: Yeah.
Mr. Lavin: What about studies on getting information from people, were those covered in your Ph.D. program?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember what you studied about that?
John Bruce Jessen: As a clinician, you have to talk to people, so you're taught appropriate dialogue.
Mr. Lavin: Does that include hostile people?
John Bruce Jessen: It could.
Mr. Lavin: What about ethics, was that covered in your course work?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Did you have was it compulsory to take a course on ethics?
John Bruce Jessen: It probably was.
Mr. Lavin: Were those the ethics put out by the American Psychological Association or some other kind of ethics?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't remember specifically.
Mr. Lavin: After you were done with your Ph.D., did you have to do any sort of continuing education on ethics?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: What sort of form did that take?
John Bruce Jessen: Well, periodically you have to have so many credit hours of continuing education. I don't remember the specifics.
Mr. Lavin: Did you complete the ones that were required for licensure?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember just sort of ballpark about how often you would have to take a refresher course?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Did you have to write a dissertation for your Ph.D.?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember the topic of it?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: What was that?
John Bruce Jessen: This may not be precise, it's been a long time.
Mr. Lavin: Sure.
John Bruce Jessen: It was a study on the effect of family sculpting on family dynamics.
Mr. Lavin: What does family sculpting mean?
John Bruce Jessen: It's a therapeutic modality developed by a Dr. Kablum (ph) where to help a family examine difficulties, you have them act out rolls regarding specific dynamics that they're struggling with.
Mr. Lavin: Did that involve doing any kind of research when you wrote that dissertation?
John Bruce Jessen: Yeah, you have to review literature and be familiar with what's been done and so on.
Mr. Lavin: What about any kind of experimentation?
John Bruce Jessen: It's not when you do a dissertation well, I don't I don't know if you could classify it as experimentation, if you do research, you have a hypothesis that you posit and then you see if what you do affects it or not.
Mr. Lavin: And beyond sort of a literature review, is there is there any other kind of research involved in that dissertation you wrote?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. So after that after graduating with your Ph.D., did you do an internship?
John Bruce Jessen: Do what?
Mr. Lavin: Sorry. An internship?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Where was that?
John Bruce Jessen: My hearing is not good, so you'll need to speak up.
Mr. Lavin: I'll do so. Thanks for letting me know.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay. I did an internship at Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio, Texas.
Mr. Lavin: And what kind of cases did you see there?
John Bruce Jessen: The typical clinical psychology cases.
Mr. Lavin: So folks struggling with various kinds of mental illness?
John Bruce Jessen: You see inpatient, outpatient, military and dependent.
Mr. Lavin: Any of those folks have battle fatigue?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't recall seeing anyone with battle fatigue while I was doing my residency or my internship.
Mr. Lavin: And then after your internship, where did you go next?
John Bruce Jessen: I went to California, Mather Air Force Base.
Mr. Lavin: How long were you there for?
John Bruce Jessen: Three or four years.
Mr. Lavin: And was it another sort of treating clinical psychologist role?
John Bruce Jessen: Uh-huh.
Mr. Lavin: And do you remember if during that time you saw any folks with battle fatigue?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't remember.
Mr. Lavin: Was there was there a point where that diagnosis, if you would have seen it, would shift over to posttraumatic stress disorder?
John Bruce Jessen: Obviously the name changed. I don't know when.
Mr. Lavin: And you you became aware of that at some point?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Did you receive any kind of training in diagnosing that condition?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't recall going to a specific course, but the diagnosis is in the DSM manual, so I was familiar with what
Mr. Lavin: And as a military psychologist, it's conceivable that you would be called upon at some point to treat someone with that condition?
John Bruce Jessen: It is conceivable.
Mr. Lavin: Did you, in fact, ever treat someone who you diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder?
John Bruce Jessen: Very briefly.
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember roughly when that was?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes, I do, but I probably will need to consult with the Department of Defense.
Mr. Lavin: So I'm not going to ask you to get into any specifics about it, but you should definitely consult whenever whenever you're concerned?
John Bruce Jessen: Well, in order to
Cody Smith: I think you've answered the question that's pending. Let's wait for the next question.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: Yeah. So so just to clarify, if you think a question does call for classified information, please feel free to stop the question or stop your answer rather.
John Bruce Jessen: That's what I was attempting to do.
Mr. Lavin: Yes.
John Bruce Jessen: Is there another way you want me to do that? I mean, just say, Stop, I think this is classified?
Mr. Lavin: No, that's good. And also saying, you know, that you need to consult with the Department of Defense is just fine.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: So I'm not going to ask you any any specifics about that person who you briefly treated. Just generally speaking, do you remember you know what? Scratch that. So after you're I believe we were telling me that afterwards you went to the to be a clinical psychologist was that after your internship, was that at the US Air Force Hospital at Mather Air Force Base?
John Bruce Jessen: No. US Air Force Hospital, yes, it was.
Mr. Lavin: Yes. And then what was your next job?
John Bruce Jessen: I went to San Vito Air Station, Italy.
Mr. Lavin: And what was your role there?
Cody Smith: Would it be helpful if you put his resume in front of him? Maybe we could move this along.
Mr. Lavin: Sure, I don't mind. If that would be helpful for you. Would you like your resume, sir?
John Bruce Jessen: It's all written down there.
Mr. Lavin: All right. Well, would you like to mark the next exhibit? (Exhibit No. 26, Resume for Bruce Jessen, LLC, Bates US 1901 through 1905, was marked for identification.) It looks like you were the Chief of Mental Health at San Vito Air Station; is that correct?
John Bruce Jessen: Uh-huh.
Mr. Lavin: And what what did you do in that role, to the extent that it that it is not classified?
John Bruce Jessen: I did clinical psychology for active duty and dependent personnel.
Cody Smith: Mr. Lavin, so the record is clear, we placed before the witness what's been marked as Exhibit No. 26. It bears US Bates labels, last four digits, 1901 through 1905.
Mr. Lavin: Thank you, Mr. Smith. And did you supervise other psychologists in that role?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: So what does it mean to be the Chief of Mental Health?
John Bruce Jessen: Depends where you're at.
Mr. Lavin: What did it mean at San Vito Air Station?
John Bruce Jessen: It meant I was the only mental health provider at the air station.
Mr. Lavin: I see. And it looks like after that you went to you went to the US Air Force Survival School?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Is that right? And what did you do there?
John Bruce Jessen: I was in charge of monitoring the instructors and the students as they went through training.
Mr. Lavin: And were you still treating patients at that time as well?
John Bruce Jessen: I would see instructors and their families if they had work-related or generic clinical-related problems, and I would see students if they had acute problems when they were going through the course.
Mr. Lavin: And was that just for diagnosis purposes?
John Bruce Jessen: It was a little more with students it was a little more like triage, you you intervene, and if they need follow-on care, you send them back to their base or refer them somewhere else.
Mr. Lavin: And for the more long-term folks, was it more like treatment?
John Bruce Jessen: I saw some instructors and some family members of instructors for longer treatment.
Mr. Lavin: When your role was described as Chief Psychological Services?
John Bruce Jessen: That's correct.
Mr. Lavin: And did that mean that you supervised other people?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: What what sort of what were the roles of the people you supervised?
John Bruce Jessen: I supervised, I believe, three psychological technicians.
Mr. Lavin: What's a psychological technician?
John Bruce Jessen: It's a paraprofessional trained by the military to assist in psychological care.
Mr. Lavin: Does that mean they would ask questions of of people who, you know, were experiencing some kind of distress?
John Bruce Jessen: Sometimes.
Mr. Lavin: Would they aid in the treatment, too?
John Bruce Jessen: Sometimes.
Mr. Lavin: All right. And at the same time, you were also supervising the instructors at the combat school?
John Bruce Jessen: Monitoring would be a more accurate term.
Mr. Lavin: What what sort of things would you monitor them for?
John Bruce Jessen: Make sure that their comportment was consistent with the operating instructions for the programs they were in.
Mr. Lavin: What does that what does that mean?
John Bruce Jessen: There are two basic divisions of training at a survival school: There's field training, which consists of helping people take care of themselves if they're isolated, building shelters, merging themselves, also protecting themselves from the enemy if they're in a combat area and rendering assistance to others if needed. The other part is the resisting training laboratory. And DOD, I'll do my best to stay where I need to be, but stop me if I go somewhere I shouldn't, please.
Andrew Warden: We will.
John Bruce Jessen: So some of our military at times are captured either by a lawful enemy or detained by a government or held by terrorists, and the resistance training laboratory is designed to help them acquire skills so that if they're in that position, they can protect the United States government and themselves.
Mr. Lavin: And if you can answer, do you run different scenarios for different types of captors?
John Bruce Jessen: There are there are different scenarios, there are different courses, there are different threats that are addressed in the different courses. In the more advanced courses, particularly related to counterterrorism, we had to prepare scenarios that were consistent and accurate to various terrorist groups, their modus operandi, how they would treat captives, what their weaknesses were, what their beliefs were, what their vulnerabilities were, condense that into a package so that if one of these high-risk operators were captured, sometimes they're specific to a mission. If they go into a particular place and there's a particular terrorist group and the risk of capture is high, then you tailor it in that way. Those are fewer in number, but higher in risk of capture. The general school is for in the Air Force anyway, is for anyone on flying status and anyone who would be stationed in high-risk of capture zones. They receive scenario training also, but it's more generic, and it is more consistent with the Code of Conduct. So it's not as specific, but it's designed to prepare them for a different environment.
Mr. Lavin: You said that you would monitor the comportment of the people who were instructing these scenarios, do I have that right?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: And what would be sort of an improper comportment for an individual monitoring a scenario sorry, let me rephrase that. What would be an improper comportment for an individual who was training in that scenario?
John Bruce Jessen: There is a phenomenon that those of us who work in this area identify as abusive drift, and without proper oversight and independent eyes on authorities, people can start to push the limits of what they're authorized to do, and part of my role was to make sure that I identified that and stopped it.
Mr. Lavin: And that that would happen even in training?
John Bruce Jessen: It does happen sometimes in training or the emergence of it is evident.
Mr. Lavin: Do you think it happens more in training or in real world-type scenarios?
John Bruce Jessen: I think it happens more in real world.
Mr. Lavin: And in the course of your monitoring of these scenarios these training scenarios, did you ever have to stop a trainer from doing something that he or she was doing?
John Bruce Jessen: Rarely.
Mr. Lavin: But it happens sometimes?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: So you monitored these scenarios for about four years as the Chief of Psychological Services; is that correct?
John Bruce Jessen: I think that's correct.
Mr. Lavin: And then how did your role change when you became deputy director?
John Bruce Jessen: I went into a different classified program.
Mr. Lavin: It says here: Deputy Director, Code of Conduct SERE Training Directorate, Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. Without saying anything that's classified, it looks like at least the name of this agency, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, and of the Code of Conduct SERE Training Directorate are unclassified. Is there anything you can say about your role there?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Could you tell me in unclassified terms what that role entailed?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: What did that role entail?
John Bruce Jessen: It evolved over time. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency didn't exist when I started. It was called Operation Operating Location Fairchild. They continued to do the same basic mission, but became absorbed as the bureaucracy grew and the demands changed. So my role was similar to what I had done at the basics school, but in addition, I became responsible for SERE psychology in the Department of Defense, because there are other services teaching other courses, same basic standard, but different services, and other psychologists that work there.
Mr. Lavin: And did you supervise the psychologists in the other programs in some way?
John Bruce Jessen: Supervise probably isn't the accurate word.
Mr. Lavin: How would you describe it?
John Bruce Jessen: I consulted with them and I worked for the office who had ultimate authority over the training they were conducting.
Mr. Lavin: Did you play any role in deciding the guidelines for what techniques could and could not be used in the different branches of SERE training?
John Bruce Jessen: Not really.
Mr. Lavin: Were you aware that there were different guidelines in the different schools?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Did the did the Navy SERE school, for example, allow use of the waterboard, to the best of your knowledge?
John Bruce Jessen: One of them did.
Mr. Lavin: Was the waterboard permitted in the Air Force school?
John Bruce Jessen: No. It wasn't used. I don't know if they ever made some kind of decision to not allow it, but it wasn't used.
Mr. Lavin: And was the was the Code of Conduct SERE Training Directorate the entity that would make those types of decisions as to what was allowed?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes. Well, ultimately the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency would make that decision.
Mr. Lavin: And I think I think it also says here, that at the same time that you had that Joint Personnel Recovery Agency role, you were also the senior Department of Defense SERE psychologist. Was there anything different in that role than the role you were you had in the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency?
John Bruce Jessen: Not really.
Mr. Lavin: Were you still treating patients at all during this time?
John Bruce Jessen: Infrequently.
Mr. Lavin: Do you have any kind of estimate on how often you'd treat a patient?
John Bruce Jessen: I could only guess.
Mr. Lavin: All right. Well, I'm not going to ask you to guess. What about what about just sort of that that triage role for for trainees, did you do any of that during this time?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: So if a trainee was experiencing some difficulty in the training, you might talk to them to see the nature of their problem?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: And if their problem seemed to have some level of seriousness, you might refer them to their base's treating psychologist?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Did you ever see, during the course of those triages, a trainee who was exhibiting signs of posttraumatic stress disorder?
John Bruce Jessen: I think so.
Mr. Lavin: What did you do when you saw that sign of posttraumatic stress disorder?
John Bruce Jessen: I intervened.
Mr. Lavin: What was the nature of that intervention?
John Bruce Jessen: Pull them from training, stabilize them, consult with them, see if they can go back in training, and if they can't, then continue to work with them until you've handed them off to their home unit.
Mr. Lavin: Did you have to sometimes make the call that people just couldn't continue with training?
John Bruce Jessen: I hadn't I never made that call.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. Now, you were also a professor at times; is that correct?
John Bruce Jessen: I taught college courses.
Mr. Lavin: What kind of courses were those?
John Bruce Jessen: Clinical psychology courses.
Mr. Lavin: Were those undergrads that you were teaching?
John Bruce Jessen: Mostly.
Mr. Lavin: Do you recall if in those courses you ever taught about posttraumatic stress disorder?
John Bruce Jessen: I didn't.
Mr. Lavin: What about teaching them about ethics?
John Bruce Jessen: Once.
Mr. Lavin: When when was that?
John Bruce Jessen: I was asked by the local CME provider to help with an ethics course that I was attending.
Mr. Lavin: Do you recall what the ethics course was teaching?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. Now, did you ever teach graduate students or were they just undergraduates?
John Bruce Jessen: I've taught graduate students.
Mr. Lavin: Did you ever supervise any kind of research conducted by a graduate student?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: I'd like to direct your attention to that second page of your your resume marked with US Bates 1902. And if you look there, there's a table of the Special Mission Unit courses that it says you you researched, developed and applied, and the fourth from the bottom there on the right says, "Legal aspects of captivity." Do you see that?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Do you recall teaching that course?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember what you meant by "legal aspects of captivity"?
John Bruce Jessen: This was a course to help these high risk of capture people understand some of the eccentricities of foreign government legal systems that might entrap them.
Mr. Lavin: So you did you cover any kind of international law in that course?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: So when you when you taught students about or sorry, when you taught the Special Mission Units about the legal aspects of captivity, did you cover the Geneva Conventions?
John Bruce Jessen: That's a different block of training.
Mr. Lavin: Did you ever train anyone on the Geneva Conventions?
John Bruce Jessen: We familiarized students with the Geneva Conventions.
Mr. Lavin: When you say familiarized sort of what does that mean?
John Bruce Jessen: We had a canned presentation from the Department of Defense that we were instructed to give to the students.
Mr. Lavin: And did you, in fact, give it to the students?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: All right. Have you ever debriefed released American prisoners of war?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Had any of them been subject to coercion?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Any of them been subject to physical coercion?
John Bruce Jessen: A few.
Mr. Lavin: And did you interview them when they returned?
John Bruce Jessen: Did I interview them?
Mr. Lavin: When they returned to the United States?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Did you assess them for whether they had suffered any kind of long-term effects from their treatment?
John Bruce Jessen: When repatriation, reintegration takes place, you have a team of specialists, including psychiatrists, physicians, psychologists, a plethora of people, so if I suspected that someone was suffering ill effects as a result of coercion, I would definitely talk to them about it, but I would ultimately refer them to the person on the team who was there to take care of that.
Mr. Lavin: And were there, in fact, people who, in the course of their reintegration, you assessed to be experiencing ill effects as a result of the coercion they experienced?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Without, you know, identifying any individual, could you describe for me what what that kind of ill effect would be that you could see as a result of coercion?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes. I could give you an example.
Mr. Lavin: Please do.
John Bruce Jessen: A pilot, a group that's highly athletic, shot down, captured, held in a prison, makeshift prison, not fit adequately, lost a significant amount of weight and muscle mass could become very preoccupied with that when his self- identity was highly invested in his physicality. So it could come to represent, not just a physical degradation, but it could have attached to it a multitude of other concerns or experiences associated with captivity.
Mr. Lavin: And did you did you see cases in which people were sort of affected by their captivity in ways that changed their sense of self or challenged it in some way?
John Bruce Jessen: The people I worked with were a pretty robust group. I don't recall anyone who didn't bounce back well from what happened.
Mr. Lavin: So even even the people who initially experienced some kind of ill effects, they get better with treatment?
John Bruce Jessen: They what?
Mr. Lavin: They get better with treatment?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Is it your understanding that that they could basically be cured after some period of time?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Do you have a sense of how much treatment would that might entail to cure someone of this kind of damage?
John Bruce Jessen: It varies.
Mr. Lavin: Could it be years?
John Bruce Jessen: It varies.
Mr. Lavin: Just, you know, I'm not a professional, so I'm I'm just trying to get a sense here. Could it be as short as a few days?
John Bruce Jessen: It varies.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. And these these robust pilots and others, had they been resistance trained in the United States before they had fallen into captivity?
John Bruce Jessen: Some.
Mr. Lavin: Was there a noticeable difference in terms of the resilience of folks who had been resistance trained and those who had not been resistance trained?
John Bruce Jessen: On the whole there is a difference.
Mr. Lavin: What would that difference be?
John Bruce Jessen: If you have a plan, almost regardless of its effectiveness, you have more of a sense of control and predictability, which helps you be more resilient.
Mr. Lavin: And if you lose control and predictability, would you be less resilient?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Did you ever diagnose any of these returning POWs with any
John Bruce Jessen: I don't understand.
Mr. Lavin: Sorry. Did you ever did you ever assess them, you know, in accordance with, say, the DSM to determine whether they had some condition?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Was that a responsibility of someone else on the team?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Were you aware of any diagnoses that were given to these returned POWs?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't remember. I don't know if I ever knew.
Mr. Lavin: Ballpark, do you have a sense of how many returned POWs and captives you were involved in debriefing?
John Bruce Jessen: Just a I could only give you a guess.
Mr. Lavin: Do you think it's more than ten?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: More than 20?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. Now, we were talking earlier about supervising, or sorry, monitoring the resistance training scenarios. In the context of monitoring those resistance training scenarios, did you ever observe the use of physical techniques as a training measure?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Are there an array of techniques that were used, for example, at the Air Force base, Fairchild?
John Bruce Jessen: I'm not sure what you mean.
Mr. Lavin: I guess what I mean is, is there sort of a menu of techniques that a that a trainer would use in order to train the people going through the SERE program?
John Bruce Jessen: I wouldn't call it a menu.
Mr. Lavin: What should I call it?
John Bruce Jessen: I think a list, like you said
Mr. Lavin: Okay.
John Bruce Jessen: is accurate.
Mr. Lavin: So was this list of techniques kept somewhere or was it more of an informal thing?
John Bruce Jessen: This list is has its origin and the authority to use it in the Department of Defense through, I think, now the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, and they're the only ones that can authorize the SERE schools to use the techniques.
Mr. Lavin: And do you know what these sorry. Do you know how how these techniques were initially selected or proposed?
John Bruce Jessen: I have a general understanding.
Mr. Lavin: What what would that be?
John Bruce Jessen: My understanding is at the conclusion of World War I, it became evident that our country wasn't doing an adequate job in preparing service members for captivity. It was at that time that the Code of Conduct was promulgated, and not long after that, various elements within the Department of Defense started to do training and over time they identified these techniques, precisely by whom or when, I don't know. And when I came to work for the agency, they were already established, codified, but that's my recollection of their history.
Mr. Lavin: Did the during the time you were at the agency, did the list of techniques change in some way?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't remember.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. I'd like to introduce another exhibit, which is tab 2. Would you please mark this one? (Exhibit No. 27, Report of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in US Custody, was marked for identification.) I think it was marked the last time.
Cody Smith: I don't think it was.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. Here it is. So we've marked, for the record, a document labeled Report of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate, Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in US Custody. That's marked as what exhibit number is that?
Cody Smith: 27.
Mr. Lavin: Thank you. Have you ever seen this report?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember giving testimony to the Committee on Armed Services?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember roughly when that was?
John Bruce Jessen: Years ago.
Mr. Lavin: Maybe around 2007, does that sound
John Bruce Jessen: I don't remember specifically.
Mr. Lavin: All right. I'd like to direct your attention to the page numbered XXVI.
John Bruce Jessen: Page number what?
Cody Smith: XXVI.
Mr. Lavin: That would be in the Introduction. There's there's a list there of what the Senate Armed Services Committee labeled as its conclusions.
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know where you're at.
Cody Smith: I can help you. There you go.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: So if I could direct your attention to Conclusion No. 3 and just have you review that and let me know when you're ready. So you see there at the end it says: "The purpose of SERE resistance training is to increase the ability of US personnel to resist abusive interrogations, and the techniques used were based in part on Chinese Communist techniques used during the Korean War to elicit false confessions." Did you ever have an understanding that the SERE techniques were based in part on Chinese Communist techniques from the Korean War?
John Bruce Jessen: I think I do remember that.
Mr. Lavin: Do you think you knew that when you were a SERE psychologist?
John Bruce Jessen: When I was at the SERE school.
Mr. Lavin: When you were at the SERE, yeah.
John Bruce Jessen: Yeah.
Mr. Lavin: And do you think you knew at the time that these techniques had been used by the Chinese Communists to elicit false confessions?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't remember false confessions.
Mr. Lavin: Did you have any sense of whether these techniques could induce a person to make a false confession?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't understand your question.
Mr. Lavin: So there's this list of techniques that's authorized for use by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency
John Bruce Jessen: Right.
Mr. Lavin: for use in training our soldiers to resist certain kinds of interrogation, and you had some awareness that these some of these techniques were based in part on Korean War techniques used by the Chinese Communists. What I want to know is whether you had any understanding at the time that these techniques could induce an individual who is being subjected to them to make a false confession?
Cody Smith: Objection. You can answer the question. You can answer.
John Bruce Jessen: Yeah. I don't have a specific memory of concluding that these could be used for false confessions.
Mr. Lavin: Do you think there's a do you think it was inaccurate of the Senate to say that they could be used for false confessions?
Cody Smith: Objection. You may answer.
Mr. Lavin: Let me let me ask that in a better way. Your lawyer is right, of course. Do you think so the sentence here is: "Using those techniques for interrogating detainees was also inconsistent with the goal of collecting accurate intelligence information as the purpose of SERE resistance training is to increase the ability of US personnel to resist abusive interrogations, and the techniques used were based in part on Chinese Communists techniques used during the Korean War to elicit false confessions." Do you agree with that sentence?
Cody Smith: Let me just state for the record my objection. The witness has testified that he hasn't seen this document before. You have a right to review the document in its entirety before you answer that question. Now, I'm not suggesting that you want to go through 200-some pages, but you have the right to do that.
John Bruce Jessen: Well, I don't know who wrote it. It's obviously written with an agenda because it suggests people were treated like animals. I think that you may be conflating what happened in the Department of Defense in Abu Ghraib with other things, or maybe you're trying to connect them. So I'm not I'm not sure of the direction of your question and I don't know what's in here. I want to answer your question truthfully, but I don't want to be trapped by some scheme. So if you'll rephrase the question again, I'll try and answer it again honestly.
Mr. Lavin: Sure. I you know, leaving aside any any matters about Abu Ghraib or anything else, I'm really just curious about whether you agree or disagree with the sentence here which, you know, I can paraphrase it, but I really would just prefer to have you let me know if this sentence is wrong, and if it's wrong, why it's wrong. So the sentence again is: "The use of" it might be easier in fact, let's take the whole conclusion. I apologize for starting with the second sentence. "The use of techniques similar to those used in SERE resistance training"
John Bruce Jessen: You know, I don't think I can answer your question. I don't know what they were thinking when they wrote this, I don't know what their agenda was. I know they certainly had one when I talked to them. I don't know what you're getting at. I'm not trying to be obstructionistic, but I'm trying to be prudent.
Mr. Lavin: All right. Let's let's leave this aside for a moment. Let me direct your attention to a different page, which is XIII.
John Bruce Jessen: XIII?
Mr. Lavin: That's right.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: So if you look at the third paragraph there, it says: "JPRA is the DOD agency that oversees military survival, evasion, resistance and escape training." Is that accurate?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: And then the next sentence says: "During the resistance phase of SERE training, US military personnel are exposed to physical and psychological pressures," and it says those are SERE techniques, "designed to simulate conditions to which they might be subject if taken prisoner by enemies that do not abide by the Geneva Conventions." Is that accurate?
John Bruce Jessen: You should ask the Department of Defense expert over there. It's his document, not mine.
Mr. Lavin: I mean, we you know, we may do that, but right now you're the one under oath, so if you can just let me know if that is an accurate sentence?
John Bruce Jessen: I think it is.
Mr. Lavin: Is there is there some hesitation? Do you think there might be a reason why it's not accurate?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. So you don't know of a reason why that sentence would not be accurate?
John Bruce Jessen: You have me confused.
Mr. Lavin: I apologize. Let me let's just go to that sentence again and you can just tell me if there's anything there that's not accurate. "During the resistance phase of SERE training, US military personnel are exposed to physical and psychological pressures (SERE techniques) designed to simulate conditions to which they might be subject if taken prisoner by enemies that do not abide by the Geneva Conventions."
John Bruce Jessen: I think that is accurate, but I am not the DOD spokesman.
Mr. Lavin: All right. But you were you were a SERE instructor, right?
John Bruce Jessen: I was the a SERE instructor is associated with the basic program, so I was an instructor, but it was with a special survival training program.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. And did that survival training program also simulate conditions to which a person who was experiencing the program might be subject to if taken prisoner by enemies that did not abide by the Geneva Conventions?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: The next sentence says: "As one JPRA instructor explains, SERE training is based on illegal exploitation under the rules listed in the 1949 Geneva Conventions relative to the treatment of prisoners of war of prisoners over the last 50 years." Is that accurate?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know who determines what's legal and illegal, but the techniques were to represent what we thought our enemy might do if they weren't adhering to the Geneva Conventions.
Mr. Lavin: So the techniques were simulating violations of the Geneva Conventions?
John Bruce Jessen: Possibly.
Mr. Lavin: Now, the next paragraph in this document says: "Typically those who play the part of interrogators in SERE school neither are trained interrogators nor are they qualified to be." Do you see with that sentence?
John Bruce Jessen: Typically. Typically that's accurate.
Mr. Lavin: It says: "These role players are not trained to obtain reliable intelligence information from detainees." Is that accurate?
John Bruce Jessen: Typically that's accurate.
Mr. Lavin: And it says: "Their job is to train our personnel to resist providing reliable information to our enemies." Is that correct?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: "As the Deputy Commander for the Joint Forces Command, JPRA's highest headquarters put it, 'The expertise of JPRA lies in training personnel how to respond and resist interrogations, not in how to conduct interrogations.'" Is that accurate?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Thank you. So prior to 9/11, did you ever discuss with anyone the possibility of using this list of SERE techniques to actually interrogate prisoners?
Cody Smith: Objection.
Mr. Lavin: You can answer.
John Bruce Jessen: Am I supposed to answer?
Cody Smith: Yes, sir.
John Bruce Jessen: No, I did not.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. Do you remember the first time you discussed with someone the possibility of using SERE techniques in a real life interrogation?
John Bruce Jessen: I do.
Mr. Lavin: Was that person Dr. Mitchell that you discussed that with?
John Bruce Jessen: He was one of them.
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember roughly the timeframe which you had this first conversation?
John Bruce Jessen: I do.
Mr. Lavin: When was that?
John Bruce Jessen: June 2002.
Mr. Lavin: So prior to that time, you don't recall ever discussing the use of SERE techniques in a real world interrogation?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Now, after 9/11, I believe the CIA commissioned Dr. Mitchell to review a document that has been described as the Manchester manual. Do you know what I'm referring to?
John Bruce Jessen: I do.
Mr. Lavin: Did you aid Mr. Mitchell in that review?
John Bruce Jessen: I did.
Mr. Lavin: And do you recall how you became involved in reviewing the Manchester manual?
John Bruce Jessen: I do.
Mr. Lavin: How did that come to happen?
John Bruce Jessen: I was contacted by first a person in the CIA and then by Dr. Mitchell who had asked for permission from the Department of Defense to come and help them.
Mr. Lavin: And that permission was granted?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: And so did you and Dr. Mitchell produce a paper that was titled, "Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to Al-Qaeda Resistance Training to Interrogation Techniques, A Resisting Training Perspective"?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: And I think I think that document was marked as Exhibit 9 at Dr. Mitchell's deposition, or a redacted version of that document. Do you have that or would you like our copy?
Cody Smith: We'll take it just to move things along.
Mr. Schuelke: Thank you.
Mr. Lavin: Now, do you recognize this document?
John Bruce Jessen: I recognize that title.
Mr. Lavin: If you if you turn to page 2 of this document, which is United States Bates 001149, if you want to just look at the executive summary to refresh your recollection. I wanted to ask you a question about it. Now, I just want to ask about a sentence in there where I believe you and Dr. Mitchell wrote: "We are familiar with how hostile countries approach interrogation and knowledgeable about how trained captives organize their resistance efforts." And what I wanted to ask you about is: How did you become familiar with how hostile countries approached interrogation?
John Bruce Jessen: Could you repeat that? I didn't hear the last part.
Mr. Lavin: Sure. How did you become familiar with how hostile countries approached interrogation?
John Bruce Jessen: So Department of Defense, you'll have to help me here because I don't want to step across a line.
Mr. Lavin: Do you want to take a minute to consult with them?
John Bruce Jessen: No, I'm ready. This pertains more particularly to Special Mission Units than it does standard SERE training students. We, the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, trained specific Special Mission Units in what we would call their high risk of capture course, and additionally conducted exercises, known exercises, often to prepare them for specific missions. In the course of this work, we had to review and be spun up on a lot of intel regarding the environment they're going into, the groups that might hold them captive, their techniques, procedures, their TTP.
Mr. Lavin: I'm sorry, what does TTP mean?
John Bruce Jessen: Techniques, tactics and procedures.
Mr. Lavin: Oh. Thank you.
John Bruce Jessen: So that if they were captured, they could take care of themselves. So as a result, we were quite current on the various terrorist groups, hostile governments, and these scenarios would be constructed in a way that the operator would go into a training scenario that was realistic, they would be captured and they would be confronted by as realistic as possible the enemy that they might face. In order to do that, you have to understand these things.
Mr. Lavin: And why would why would familiarity with how hostile countries approach interrogation, why would that inform a paper on countermeasures for the United States to use against Al-Qaeda captives?
John Bruce Jessen: You lost me.
Mr. Lavin: Sure. So you're providing here, if I'm understanding it correctly, a summary, and it says that it suggests methods for recognizing sophisticated resistance to interrogation techniques that are being used, as well as it provides how to some kind of suggestion as to how to develop countermeasures to that resistance training.
John Bruce Jessen: Correct.
Mr. Lavin: What I'm trying to understand is, you're you're explaining here, I believe, your qualifications to provide that type of of analysis. And you're including in here your combined 32 years of experience in providing operational support to detained US personnel, training special operations personnel as you were describing, debriefing hostages as we talked about, and then you say: "We're familiar with how hostile countries approach interrogation." And I'm I'm just trying to understand why the way hostile countries approach interrogation is relevant to the developing of countermeasures for the United States to use.
Cody Smith: Objection. You may answer the question.
John Bruce Jessen: Well, do you understand the history of this Manchester manual?
Mr. Lavin: I understand I understand some of its history. You know, I don't need you to get into its history.
John Bruce Jessen: I don't think you can I don't think I can answer your question without explaining to you what happened.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. I don't mean to cut you off.
John Bruce Jessen: No, I didn't feel cut off.
Andrew Warden: If the witness needs a minute, we'll be happy to consult with him on this.
Mr. Lavin: Sure. Why don't we do that?
Andrew Warden: At least vis-à-vis the Manchester manual.
Mr. Lavin: Yeah. Absolutely. Let's do that. So can we go off the record?
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 11:22 AM. We are now off the video record. (Lunch recess.) The time is now 1:22 PM. We are now back on the video record.
Mr. Lavin: So I think before we broke, you testified that no one likes to be the recipient of physical pressures, but that you've had all these things done to you multiple times, not by hostile governments, but certainly in very realistic ways. In your mind, is there a difference between having these things pressures done to you by a hostile government versus in training?
John Bruce Jessen: In terms of how they're employed, no; in terms of where you're at emotionally, I think it is different.
Mr. Lavin: How? How so?
John Bruce Jessen: I think you'd have more concern about the outcome.
Mr. Lavin: Like what what kind of concern?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know, it depends on the person.
Mr. Lavin: They might have more fear or more despair if it were done sorry, I'll just finish my question if it were done by a hostile government?
John Bruce Jessen: Perhaps.
Mr. Lavin: Sorry. Did you have an impression when you and Dr. Mitchell put together these lists of techniques, whether the CIA had already made a decision as to whether it was going to use physical coercion on Abu Zubaydah?
John Bruce Jessen: I didn't know.
Mr. Lavin: Did there come a time when you understood the CIA to have made a decision to use physical coercion on Abu Zubaydah?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember roughly when that was?
John Bruce Jessen: Roughly.
Mr. Lavin: When was that?
John Bruce Jessen: About a month after I left Langley.
Mr. Lavin: So were you at the site at the time that that decision was made?
John Bruce Jessen: I was at a site at the time.
Mr. Lavin: And the proposal of the techniques was made at Langley?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't understand your question.
Mr. Lavin: Sure. When you and Dr. Mitchell put together the list of techniques, were you at Langley?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: If we can return to the I think it's Exhibit 27, the Armed Services Committee report. I'm looking at page 24. Now, I want to ask you about that paragraph that's right after the redacted block.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: So it says here that that you said that: "The use of physically coercive techniques may be appropriate when: 1, there is good reason to believe that the individual has perishable intelligence; 2, the techniques are lawful and authorized; 3, they are carefully controlled with medical and psychological oversight; 4, someone who is not otherwise involved in the interrogation can stop the use of the techniques; and 5, the techniques do not cause long-term physical or psychological harm." Is that your view on today on when the use of physically coercive techniques may be appropriate?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes. Yes.
Mr. Lavin: And it says here that you acknowledge that: "Empirically it is not possible to know the effect of a technique used on a detainee in the long-term unless you study the effects in the long-term." Is that accurate?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: At the time that you and Dr. Mitchell proposed the use of these techniques, did you know whether the long-term effects of the techniques had been studied?
John Bruce Jessen: I knew that they had been used for 40 years, monitored with each application, and that there was no long-term harm.
Mr. Lavin: And and by used for 40 years, do you mean used on trainees in the
John Bruce Jessen: In the SERE school.
Mr. Lavin: Do you know if there were any studies on the effects of these techniques when used on people who weren't volunteers?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Would that have made any difference to you if there were such studies?
John Bruce Jessen: I have no way of knowing that.
Mr. Lavin: Could you could you take a look at pages 30 to 31? The question I'm asking is going to be just the paragraphs at the very bottom of page 30 and continues on to 31.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: I'd just like to ask you about some of the differences between SERE training and actual detention that Dr. Ogrisseg identified. So at first it says that the difference he identified was that the extensive physical and psychological prescreening processes for SERE school students are not feasible for detainees. Do you agree with that statement?
John Bruce Jessen: That's Dr. Ogrisseg's statement, not my statement.
Mr. Lavin: Do you agree with his view?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Do you think that SERE school students received extensive physical and psychological prescreening?
John Bruce Jessen: Receive what?
Mr. Lavin: Extensive physical and psychological prescreening?
John Bruce Jessen: Well, it's not extensive, but they receive it, yes.
Mr. Lavin: And do the people in the Special Mission Units receive extensive physical and psychological prescreening?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: And the ones in the Special Missions Units would be the ones who received the more physically coercive pressures in their training?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Would you agree that that extensive physical and psychological prescreening the Special Mission Unit operators receive is not feasible for detainees?
John Bruce Jessen: No, I wouldn't. All the detainees were extensively screened. At least all the ones I've worked on.
Mr. Lavin: What was the nature of that screening?
John Bruce Jessen: They had psychological evaluations and physical evaluations, and they had psychologists, physicians who were there 24/7 who watched what was going on.
Mr. Lavin: The "watched what was going on," that would happen after the interrogation began?
John Bruce Jessen: No, it happened while it was occurring.
Mr. Lavin: Do you returning to the second difference that Dr. Ogrisseg identified. He says: "There was a variance in injuries between a SERE school student who enters training and a detainee who arrives at an interrogation facility after capture." Would you agree that there's a difference between SERE trainees and detainees?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know of any data on that. I don't know where Ogrisseg got his.
Mr. Lavin: Well, let me ask you: When you when you were overseeing or monitoring or involved in some way in the SERE program, did you ever see a SERE trainee who was being subjected to interrogation pressures while they had an open wound?
John Bruce Jessen: No, I don't think so.
Mr. Lavin: Did you ever see any kind of SERE trainee participate in a training when they had recently received a gun shot wound?
John Bruce Jessen: I never saw a SERE student who had contributed to the death of 3,000 Americans and possibly had the knowledge of where fissionable nuclear material was that could destroy a city in the United States either.
Mr. Lavin: Understood. Would you agree that SERE training was voluntary?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: And that it could be terminated by the student at any time?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Would you agree that when a detainee was in CIA custody, that was not voluntary and could not be terminated by the detainee at any time?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: You would not agree?
John Bruce Jessen: I would not agree.
Mr. Lavin: Can you explain?
John Bruce Jessen: A detainee could stop interrogation any time, all they had to do was cooperate, and during each interrogation, there were medical, psychological, administrative and intelligence staff, as well as guards, who were charged with a specific responsibility that if they felt anything was not authorized or if there was a physical or psychological threat to the detainee, that they would could and would stop it.
Mr. Lavin: Do you think there were ever points in which detainees were actually unable to stop an interrogation because they could not provide the answer to the question that would end their interrogation?
John Bruce Jessen: Never in my presence.
Mr. Lavin: To the best of your knowledge, did that ever happen in the program?
Cody Smith: Objection.
Mr. Lavin: Let me let me rephrase that.
John Bruce Jessen: I have I have no knowledge.
Cody Smith: Excuse me, he's going to rephrase his question.
John Bruce Jessen: Oh, okay.
Mr. Lavin: To the best of your knowledge, did that ever happen in the context of the CIA's formal interrogation and detention program?
Cody Smith: Objection.
John Bruce Jessen: I have no knowledge of that. I do know that there were multiple efforts by the CIA to interrogate and gain intelligence that I was not involved in and knew nothing about until I started reading the documents. The effort that I was involved in was specifically for Abu Zubaydah only, and then they asked us to help with someone else and then they asked us to help with someone else. But these other efforts that were going on at the same time in other places, I had no knowledge of at the time I was working with Zubaydah.
Cody Smith: Excuse me one second. I would ask, Mr. Warden, is the witness permitted to identify the specific detainees that the government asked him to work with?
Andrew Warden: The witness may identify the specific detainees that he was involved in interrogating and he applied the techniques we've been discussing here today. So yes, he may discuss identify those detainees, there are 119 detainees that have been publicly acknowledged to be part of the CIA program. Those detainees can be discussed if Dr. Jessen had any connection with them.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Cody Smith: So you can supplement your answer, Doctor.
John Bruce Jessen: As I said to you, I was asked to go and work on Abu Zubaydah. Later, we were asked to interrogate Nashiri, KSM. While those efforts were taking place, I learned, subsequently to interrogating Abu Zubaydah, that other efforts, other people, which predated my involvement mine and Jim's involvement, were already interrogating, questioning people at other locations. I had nothing to do with any of those efforts except for one, which you'll undoubtedly will talk to me about, Gul Rahman. So I can tell you unequivocally that what you asked me did not happen when I was there and I was present and I was helping interrogate someone. But I can't tell you what happened with all these disparate efforts that were going on because they were compartments and I didn't know.
Mr. Lavin: Okay.
Cody Smith: For the record, can you identify KSM so the record is clear?
John Bruce Jessen: Sure. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the mastermind in 9/11. Personally trained and nurtured all of the men who flew the jets into the various locations, assisted in other a lot of other operations. Arguably the most lethal terrorist that we ever interrogated and that US holds.
Mr. Lavin: Thank you. Let's turn to the document that was marked as Exhibit 18 in Dr. Mitchell's deposition.
John Bruce Jessen: Do I have that already?
Mr. Lavin: I believe your lawyer has it.
Cody Smith: I have my copy, but I don't have the original copy.
Mr. Lavin: I apologize.
Mr. Lustberg: That's my bad.
Mr. Lavin: Just take a moment or as long as you need to familiarize yourself with it.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay. Okay.
Mr. Lavin: Have you ever seen this cable before?
John Bruce Jessen: I saw it just recently with my attorneys.
Mr. Lavin: And you don't recall having seen it before then?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: You don't on the first page, it says: "While the techniques described in HQS meetings and below are administered to student volunteers in the US in a harmless way with no measurable impact on the psyche of the volunteer, we do not believe we can assure the same here for a man forced through these processes and will be made to believe this is the future course of the remainder of his life." Had that sentiment ever been expressed to you, that there might be a difference between the impact of these techniques on a SERE volunteer trainee versus a subject who is forced through these processes and will be made to believe that this is the future course of the remainder of his life?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know who wrote this and I don't know who put that sentence together and I hadn't seen it, as I said, until just recently. No cable gets released throughout going through the Chief of Base, so he may be the one that ultimately wrote it. I didn't have a discussion with him, or at least I don't remember a discussion about these specific terms. You know, I wasn't even allowed on the system at that time, so...
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember that being a concern that anyone raised in the meeting that's being discussed here?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't I don't remember that being discussed there. But I I remember years and years of working at the survival school trying to prevent this kind of thing from happening, and I also know that the CIA puts safeguards in their program, as the SERE schools did, so there wouldn't.
Mr. Lavin: So when it says: "We will make every effort possible to ensure that the subject is not permanently physically or mentally harmed, but we should not say at the outset of this process that there is no risk." Would that accurately describe the view that you had as well before Abu Zubaydah's interrogation began, that every effort would be made to prevent permanent physical or mental harm, but that it could not be said at the outset that there was no risk?
Cody Smith: Objection.
John Bruce Jessen: You're trying to put this man's words in my mouth and I didn't say this. What I did say is that we put in or the CIA put in precautions so that this didn't happen.
Mr. Lavin: And in your understanding at the time, keeping in mind those precautions that you've just mentioned, did you believe that there was any risk going forward into Abu Zubaydah's interrogation?
John Bruce Jessen: No. If I would have believed that we would do that kind of harm to a person, I wouldn't have done it.
Mr. Lavin: Did you think there might even be a small risk that that kind of harm could take place?
Cody Smith: Objection.
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know my precise thoughts, but I know I deliberated with great, soulful torment about this, and obviously I concluded that it could be done safely or I wouldn't have done it.
Mr. Lavin: Okay.
John Bruce Jessen: And in fact, when it reached a point that Dr. Mitchell and I felt that it was no longer useful, not that it was creating permanent harm, but it was no longer useful, we told them we wouldn't do it anymore, and they told us we had to continue. In the in the end, we were able to convince them that it wasn't going to be useful and they eventually stopped. Not because we thought we were doing or instilling permanent harm, but because we thought it was no longer useful. It wasn't done gratuitously.
Mr. Lavin: Can you can you just explain a little bit why you experienced torment before you made the decision that you would go forward with the interrogation?
Cody Smith: Objection.
John Bruce Jessen: I think any any normal conscionable man would have to consider carefully doing something like this. When I was called and asked to do this, I paused, I thought, I wondered. I took every precaution that I could. I asked every question that I could. I waited until the weight of the entire nation's judicial system weighed in on it and told us it was legal. I weighed that against the fact that they kept telling me every day a nuclear bomb was going to be exploded in the United States and that because I had told them to stop, I had lost my nerve and it was going to be my fault if I didn't continue. So I thought a great deal about it, sir, and I assume you would have, too, if you would have been in my place and stood up and gone to defend your nation.
Mr. Lavin: And when you said that you were told it was going to be your fault if you didn't continue, are you referring to something that happened prior to the interrogation or during the interrogation?
John Bruce Jessen: I'm referring to the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and us saying that we wanted to stop waterboarding and the CIA telling us that we couldn't because we worked for them and they wanted to continue.
Mr. Lavin: And it was your and Dr. Mitchell's feelings that it was no longer useful at that stage?
John Bruce Jessen: That's correct. And it was also the opinion of the CIA later when they did due diligence and came out in person and met with us and stopped it.
Mr. Lavin: And you and Dr. Mitchell asked them to come out and and witness it?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes, we did.
Mr. Lavin: And why did you do that?
John Bruce Jessen: Because we wanted someone with authority above the Chief of Base, who also wanted it stopped, onsite, who could talk to those men and women who were having to account to the president about their efforts to stop this nuclear explosion. We were we were soldiers doing what we were instructed to do. We knew it was lawful, we knew it was legal, we knew it had been vetted and approved, but we didn't have the power to say stop or go, but we did push back and they listened and reasonably stopped. It was an emotional time, Dror, so don't interpret my emotionality as a personal affront.
Mr. Lavin: Not at all.
John Bruce Jessen: But these are serious questions you're asking.
Mr. Lavin: Absolutely. And I appreciate your candor in answering them. And again, if if it would be helpful to stop at any time, please
John Bruce Jessen: No, I'm fine.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. You said that you you know, before using these techniques you waited a period for them to be approved?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: How were those approvals communicated to you?
John Bruce Jessen: Verbally. The approvals were sent via cable to the site, and the Chief of Base called everyone around and said that the approvals had arrived. We probably saw the portion that specifically gave us our marching orders in terms of what was what we could do and the right and left limits of what we could do. That was definitely communicated to us, so I may have seen that part of it, but I didn't see the Department of Justice ruling or opinion or anything like that. I wasn't allowed. At that I hadn't had a polygraph, I had been sent out before all of these things could be done, and so I couldn't get on the system.
Mr. Lavin: I see. Was that did you later take a polygraph and get some authorization to be on CIA systems?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes. I later took many polygraphs and was allowed to get on the system.
Mr. Lavin: Is that does the phrase "green badge" refer to that kind of authorization?
John Bruce Jessen: Not necessarily, Dror. There are two kinds of people that work for CIA: Blue badge people who are actual employees, and green badge people who are contract personnel. They all work the same, they all receive the same marching orders. They're governed by the same chain of command. We, in our case, worked for the director who then went to CTC who then went to Special Mission Unit, who then went to Renditions and Interrogation Group, then went to the Chief of Station, wherever we were, and then to the Chief of Base, and everything that we did went through that chain. Every interrogation plan went through that chain, every change of plan or use of technique went through that change, and it was all authorized.
Mr. Lavin: Just while we're we're still on this document. Just towards the actually, on paragraph 3, it says: "The above said, We defer to experts, and as requested, ref below in paras 4 and 5 please find comments drafted by interrogation team members, IC SERE psychologists of Ref B concerning points raised." Is the reference there to IC SERE psychologists, to the best of your knowledge, a reference to Dr. Mitchell and yourself?
Cody Smith: Objection.
John Bruce Jessen: You know, I didn't write the cable, like I said. I don't know who they were referring to. It doesn't have my name on there.
Mr. Lavin: In in July of 2002, were there other independent contractor SERE psychologists, to the best of your knowledge, working for CIA?
John Bruce Jessen: I wouldn't know that, but I don't know of any.
Mr. Lavin: And were there you didn't know of any?
John Bruce Jessen: I was working in a compartment and you don't know anything outside of your compartment.
Mr. Lavin: And within your compartment were there other IC SERE psychologists?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: At the at the very end of that this document, it says: "Speaking directly to the issue of inducing severe mental pain"
John Bruce Jessen: Where are you?
Mr. Lavin: Sorry about that. It's right above paragraph 6.
John Bruce Jessen: I see, where you have the highlighted?
Mr. Lavin: Yup.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: So saying that any physical pressure applied to extremes can cause severe mental pain or suffering, is that an accurate statement?
John Bruce Jessen: I have no idea.
Mr. Lavin: Do you have a sense of whether okay. What about the sentence, "The safety of any techniques lies primarily in how it is applied and monitored," would you agree with that?
John Bruce Jessen: I would.
Mr. Lavin: Would you agree that including the use of loud music, sleep deprivation, controlling darkness and light, slapping, walling or the use of stress positions taken to an extreme can have the same outcome?
John Bruce Jessen: What outcome?
Mr. Lavin: I believe the outcome is if it well, let me just ask you: If those techniques, including the use of loud music, sleep deprivation, controlling darkness and light, slapping, walling, or the use of stress positions are taken to an extreme, do you believe that they can cause severe mental pain or suffering?
John Bruce Jessen: I believe if they were taken to extreme, they could be detrimental.
Mr. Lavin: What do you mean by detrimental?
John Bruce Jessen: You don't understand detrimental?
Mr. Lavin: I guess to me
Cody Smith: He's allowed to ask you that question, so answer it.
John Bruce Jessen: Oh, okay. Well, it means not good. Harmful in some way.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. All right.
John Bruce Jessen: I know you know what detrimental means.
Mr. Lavin: Do you think there is a difference between an extreme form of a technique being detrimental and an extreme form of a technique inducing severe mental pain or suffering?
Cody Smith: Objection.
John Bruce Jessen: Yeah, I think there is a difference.
Mr. Lavin: Do you think it's possible that, for example, sleep deprivation taken to the extreme could induce severe mental pain or suffering?
Cody Smith: Objection.
John Bruce Jessen: I think that all precautions were taken in the CIA program to preclude that, but in a situation where they weren't, they could.
Mr. Lavin: Are there any differences between how these SERE pressures, as we've been talking about, were applied in the SERE schools as opposed to how they were applied in the CIA program?
John Bruce Jessen: A few.
Mr. Lavin: Which ones were those?
John Bruce Jessen: As applied as applied they were the same as they were applied in the SMU training, but their frequency was more in the CIA program.
Mr. Lavin: Now, Dr. Mitchell has described the effect of these techniques to be related to Pavlovian classical conditioning. Do you agree that the interrogation strategy with the SERE techniques was based on the Pavlovian classical conditioning?
Cody Smith: Can you show us where you're referring to in the document?
Mr. Lavin: Sure. Sure. So if you look at Exhibit 4 from Dr. Mitchell's deposition. This is and it's on
Cody Smith: Give us a second here, if you would.
Mr. Lavin: Sure.
Cody Smith: Can you just identify for the record what's before the witness?
Mr. Lavin: Sure. This is Exhibit 4 from Dr. Mitchell's deposition, which is a manuscript that's called is labeled Interrogating the Enemy.
Cody Smith: And in fairness, I think it was identified by Dr. Mitchell as a draft, not the final manuscript.
Mr. Lavin: A draft. Yes. And that's at pages 56 and 57 of the manuscript. And I just So anyway, there Dr. Mitchell writes that he was going to use a psychologically-based interrogation program and it would need to be based on what is called Pavlovian classical conditioning. So I wanted to ask you a little bit about that. Did you have any understanding that the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah would involve Pavlovian classical conditioning?
John Bruce Jessen: I had an understanding that it would involve stimulus response.
Mr. Lavin: What does that mean?
John Bruce Jessen: The same thing basically. I don't remember him using the term "Pavlovian," but it's similar.
Mr. Lavin: What does stimulus response mean?
John Bruce Jessen: It means you invoke a certain stimulus to get a certain response.
Mr. Lavin: And what did that mean in the context of the Abu Zubaydah interrogation?
John Bruce Jessen: The idea was if the detainees didn't respond to social influence techniques and the CIA authorized the use of physical pressures, that using physical pressure, which could be terminated by cooperation, would constitute a stimulus response.
Mr. Lavin: So the stimulus is the physical pressure and the response is how Abu Zubaydah would respond?
John Bruce Jessen: Well, the yeah, basically.
Mr. Lavin: And what was the what was the desired response that you were looking to invoke?
John Bruce Jessen: You want people to talk to you. If you're interrogating someone, you just want them to talk at first so and then of course you want them to talk about things that are useful.
Mr. Lavin: And would it be correct to say that at some times the desired response is fear or anxiety?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Were you familiar with the concept of learned helplessness in 2002?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes, I'm familiar with it.
Mr. Lavin: Did you believe that there was a role for learned helplessness in interrogation?
John Bruce Jessen: Not scientific learned helplessness where a person is rendered basically incapacitated. In the CIA's program, it was used exactly as described in the Army Field Manual, you can induce a feeling of helplessness, which is then removed, so it's a temporary applied state.
Mr. Lavin: And the idea is that the detainee feels helpless for a time?
John Bruce Jessen: Can you repeat that?
Mr. Lavin: Is the idea that the detainee feels helpless for some set period of time?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't understand your question.
Mr. Lavin: Sure. Let me rephrase it. You say it was used exactly as described in the Army Field Manual, so you can induce a feeling of helplessness, which is then removed, it's a temporary applied state. I guess, let's just take that slowly so I can understand it. What do you mean by a temporary applied state?
John Bruce Jessen: I mean, if you use a physical pressure and the person you're using it on wants you to stop and they know you'll stop if you (sic) start talking, then you have a choice, you can start talking or you can get some more physical pressure. The pressure is designed to be used in a way that it doesn't harm but it makes someone uncomfortable, you know, it's more irritating than painful, but nonetheless, not something that you want happening. So if the detainee finds something to talk about, the physical pressure stops and if they start to obfuscate and refuse to give useful information again, you can reapply the pressure. Eventually, it doesn't take long to learn that if you don't want that to happen, you can talk or cooperate in some way. So the discomfort or the helplessness, the applied state of helplessness that you feel at the time is a is a temporary feeling of, you know, how am I going to get out of this, I don't like this, I want this to stop. As I said, that's the way it's described and recommended for use in the Army Field Manual. But the scientific state of learned helplessness is something that, as you have already pointed out, Jim and I strived hard to prevent in the SERE schools. We also spent a great deal of time talking to CIA officers about this because it was a concept that they they used the term, but they didn't use the term correctly. Many of them would write cables and reports and say, We're going to use learned helplessness. They didn't understand the difference between Seligman's classic helpless state, which you don't want because then no one is going to cooperate in that state, as opposed to a temporary feeling of helplessness. So that was one of many emotions or feelings that you tried to manipulate in a detainee to encourage them to be cooperative.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. Do you recall sort of in what ways you tried to communicate to the CIA that they were misusing the term learned helplessness?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: How how did you communicate that?
John Bruce Jessen: If I saw it used inappropriately or heard it used inappropriately, I would explain the difference. I I did that many times.
Mr. Lavin: And is there I think you mentioned the Army Field Manual. Is that sort of the origin of the way let me let me rephrase that. When you and Dr. Mitchell used the term helplessness in a way that's different, as you're saying, from the learned helplessness that was used by Dr. Seligman, is the document that describes helplessness in the way that you and Dr. Mitchell use it, is that the Army Field Manual?
John Bruce Jessen: It's described that way in the Army Field Manual.
Mr. Lavin: And are there other sort of research papers or psychological manuals or any other literature that you're familiar with that uses learned helplessness in a way that's distinct from Dr. Seligman's learned helplessness?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know.
Cody Smith: Are you on a new subject matter here? When we transition, let me know. I just want to take a quick break.
Mr. Lavin: Sure. Yeah. We're we're almost there. Just one more thing on this and then we'll move.
Cody Smith: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: If we can pull Exhibit 20 from Dr. Mitchell's deposition, which is tab 18. And I'm just going to ask you about the very first page there, and then we can take the break.
John Bruce Jessen: The cover page?
Mr. Lavin: I'm sorry. That's a good question. No, it's the second page.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: And just about that that big paragraph in the middle of the page.
John Bruce Jessen: All right.
Cody Smith: Can we just identify Exhibit 20 for the record, please?
Mr. Lavin: This is this is labeled as an attachment to a fax to Dan Levin at the DOJ Command Center, and the document is labeled "Background paper on CIA's combined use of interrogation techniques." And, Dr. Jessen, I wanted to know first whether you've ever seen this document before?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: This document includes a sentence that says: "The goal of interrogation is to create a state of learned helplessness and dependence conducive to the collection of intelligence in a predictable, reliable and sustainable manner." Would you say that's an accurate statement?
John Bruce Jessen: No, I wouldn't because learned helplessness is not the only thing or helplessness is the not only thing you use in an interrogation. This sentence it says it is interrogation.
Mr. Lavin: And that's because sometimes you might have other goals besides creating a state of learned helplessness and dependence?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: What might those other goals be?
John Bruce Jessen: You might want someone to desire some kind of creature comfort or as imaginative as an interrogator can be. There are different ways to approach it. The reason I'm taking issue is because of the way this sentence reads. It says, "The goal of interrogation," and I don't agree with that.
Mr. Lavin: Yeah. What kind of I think you just mentioned creature comforts, you know, would be a different thing that is let me just let me just make sure I understand you. Would it be correct to rewrite this sentence to say sometimes the goal of interrogation is to create a state of learned helplessness?
Cody Smith: Objection.
John Bruce Jessen: It would be correct to say sometimes a feeling of helplessness, a temporary feeling of helplessness, is useful in an interrogation.
Mr. Lavin: And sometimes it would be useful to have a subject of interrogation desire a set of creature comforts that the interrogator could provide?
John Bruce Jessen: Yeah.
Mr. Lavin: What kind of creature comforts, for example? I guess what does that term mean to you?
John Bruce Jessen: Candy bar. Abu Zubaydah liked Pepsi.
Mr. Lavin: All right. I think unless Just to just to sort of close this out, sometimes a feeling of helplessness, temporary feeling of helplessness is helpful in an interrogation, but could you just elaborate a little bit on how it might be helpful?
John Bruce Jessen: Just in the way we've just discussed. We just went over that.
Mr. Lavin: Assuming in the sense that a detainee might be trying to avoid that state and therefore would be incentivized to cooperate?
John Bruce Jessen: Yeah.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. I think I think we can take that break.
Cody Smith: Good.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is now 2:20 PM. We are now off the record. This ends Disk No. 2. (Recess.) We are now back on the record. The time is 2:41 PM. This begins Disk No. 3.
Mr. Lavin: Can we get tab 20? Could you please mark this as Exhibit 29? (Exhibit No. 29, Communication, Subject: Eyes Only - Lessons for the Future, Bates US 1610 through 1615, was marked for identification.) So for the record, this is a document marked United States Bates 1610 to 1615. It appears to be some kind of communication: Subject: Eyes only - Lessons for the Future. You can just take the time to look at it. The questions I'm going to ask you are about pages 1611 and 1613. All right. Have you ever seen this document before?
John Bruce Jessen: No. It looks like it was written by an attorney.
Mr. Lavin: It does, yeah. It says: "Sets forth observations by CTC Legal." But it does say it has been coordinated in draft with outgoing, I think COB, Chief of Base, incoming, various individuals who worked for, it looks like, UBL, OTS, and it also says IC SERE psychologists, which which made me think that maybe you had seen it. Do you remember if you maybe saw some draft parts of this document?
John Bruce Jessen: No, I've never seen it.
Mr. Lavin: Well, let me let me just ask you about, on page 1613, the bottom paragraph is labeled Contract Provisions.
John Bruce Jessen: Uh-huh.
Mr. Lavin: Do you know what MOFAs means?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Me neither.
John Bruce Jessen: I've heard the term MOFA in contract or in usage somewhere, but I don't know.
Mr. Lavin: This appears to discuss various provisions that that will be used for contract personnel such as whether compensation methodology will be hourly or daily, additions to compensation that may be comparable to danger pay, hazardous duty pay or other special allowances, and authorities to operate the Government's rented vehicles. Do you recall ever having discussions about those types of contract provisions in your contract?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Do you recall ever having discussions about what kind of provisions should be included in your contracts with the CIA?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. Do you remember if there was ever an issue around you or Dr. Mitchell being reimbursed for travel, for example?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. And no no parts of this document seem familiar to you in any way?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: All right. Do you remember at all being involved in some kind of process around January 2003 that involved deriving some kinds of lessens from interrogations you had participated in?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: All right. Well then, let's move on to to tab 21. What number is this? (Exhibit No. 30, Executive Summary, Bates US 1915 through 1922, was marked for identification.) So this is a document marked as Exhibit 30 that bears Bates stamps US 1915 to 1922. And this appears to be an executive summary.
John Bruce Jessen: Do you want me to familiarize myself with it?
Mr. Lavin: If you could, please, yes. Thank you.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay. Dror?
Mr. Lavin: Yes?
John Bruce Jessen: Is this acronym DUCs referring to unlawful combatants?
Mr. Lavin: So if you you look at the very first sentence
John Bruce Jessen: Right.
Mr. Lavin: it seems like yeah, it seems to be, you know my guess
John Bruce Jessen: Do you know what it stands for?
Mr. Lavin: My guess, and I'm not my guess, and I'm not the expert, is detained unlawful combatants, but you know, I can't tell you that that's right because I don't know.
John Bruce Jessen: All right. Thanks. Okay.
Mr. Lavin: Do you recognize this document?
John Bruce Jessen: No, I've never seen it.
Mr. Lavin: Do you see on page 6 of the document, there is something labeled Appendix B, Curriculum, and it has as its sources you and Dr. Mitchell, and also Tate, Incorporated, then DOD/JPRA?
John Bruce Jessen: Uh-huh.
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember ever being consulted
Mr. Lustberg: You have to let him say yes.
Mr. Lavin: Oh, I'm sorry.
John Bruce Jessen: I didn't hear what you said.
Mr. Lavin: It was it was for me. I interrupted you while you were you had not answered yet.
John Bruce Jessen: I wasn't saying anything.
Mr. Lavin: All right. Do you see how do you see how on page 6 of this, it includes among its sources both Dr. Mitchell and yourself?
John Bruce Jessen: I do see that.
Mr. Lavin: Do you recall ever being consulted about the curriculum that is described in this appendix?
John Bruce Jessen: No, I don't.
Mr. Lavin: Do you recall ever having discussions about a curriculum that could be used to train interrogators in the CIA?
John Bruce Jessen: Do you know when this document was written? Is there a date?
Mr. Lavin: There is not, but if you if you turn to page 3, the first complete sentence at the top says: "CTC's team is implementing SERE-based individualized psychological pressures to counter Zubaydah's resistance with some success to obtain the actionable intelligence from him." Based on the timeline in Zubaydah's interrogation, do you have an estimate as to when this document might have been produced?
Cody Smith: Objection.
John Bruce Jessen: Well, I mean, you know, if it was concurrent with that, then we all know that it was sometime around August and forward in 2002. I have not seen the document. I don't I don't remember being consulted about it. I was working for the CIA. I guess if they wanted to stick my name on something as a resource, they could because we did what they asked us to do. As I told you before, we were asked to work with Zubaydah, and then we were asked to work with Nashiri, and then we were asked to work with KSM. These programs and acronyms all came as the years rolled on. They didn't even exist, to my knowledge, when we were working. There was an individual you better be ready to stop me if I get in the wrong place here. There was an individual who worked for the CIA who was a prior SERE instructor who was involved in all of this, who put together, along with an individual who is identified in your documents as the chief interrogator, they put together a training course at one time. I wasn't involved in it, I didn't know anything about it happening. There were, as I said, disparate I don't mean panicked, I mean different efforts going on that I later became aware of in the agency. As stated in this document, we have all these people, we think they have actual intelligence, what are we going to do? When I finally got to the site where I met Gul Rahman was the first time I realized that the agency had other efforts where there were people interrogating and doing these other things. I later found out there were even more than that. But I didn't know about them, and I didn't participate in them until well, I didn't participate in them except for the one exception, which I'm sure we'll talk about, where Gul Rahman was. Later, to put it quickly and bluntly, a lot of this all fell apart and there was a lot of intrigue and problems, and people were doing things they shouldn't do, they were breaking the law and stepping outside of the Department of Justice guidelines, not me and not Jim, but there were people doing that. This eventually in the SSCI all was subscribed to me and Jim. But it wasn't us. But there were things going on. Eventually, this all fell down, including the training course that was eventually put together because the guy that was in charge of it was training people to do things that weren't even authorized by the Department of Justice. When that all went to hell and they finally fired that guy and the other guy was set to the side, they came to Jim and I, and this is, I don't know, 2005, '4, I don't know when it was, and they said, Will you guys put together a course to train interrogators? And we said, Yes. And and we did that. But it wasn't until way down the road, way after this. So but I worked for the CIA and I did, as long as it was legal and authorized, anything they asked me to do, and I I don't see it unreasonable that they would say, with good intent initially, because this guy that turned out to be to have done things that he shouldn't have done, was a trusted and well-liked member and he had done great work for the agency in the past. He just he just got derailed. Anyway, if he was putting something together and someone who knew Jim and I said, Hey, let's have these guys weigh in on that, put their names down, I'm sure this SERE instructor that I'm talking about would have done that. I don't think the chief interrogator would because he had great enmity towards Jim and me, and there were conflicts that you could trace through the papers if you look carefully all along the line. But I don't know what this is. It certainly has my name on it, but I don't know what it is.
Mr. Lavin: Sure. Thank you. So would it be correct to say that you first participated in one of these interrogation training courses after 2005?
John Bruce Jessen: In a CIA interrogation course, yes, but I have I had interrogation courses before that.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. But prior to 2005, you weren't involved in the CIA prior to 2005, you weren't involved in the CIA interrogator training course?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know if 2005 is an accurate date. I do know that they asked us to put together a curriculum and we did it. I don't remember exactly when it was, but it was after this.
Mr. Lavin: After
John Bruce Jessen: But I didn't and because this is part of the question that you just asked me, Dror, at one point in time, again, 15 years ago, and I'm getting older, I don't remember precisely when, CTC came to us and they said, Will you please go and audit this course that these people have put together, tell us what you think. And it was in the United States, and we both happened to be there, and we went there, and we listened for a while until they started teaching things that were unauthorized, and we got on the phone, and I don't think we stayed there after that. But if that's what you I mean, I was there. I wasn't participating as a student, I was there.
Mr. Lavin: And when you say "unauthorized," are you referring to the techniques that were authorized for for use on Abu Zubaydah?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes. I I never used any techniques that weren't authorized initially by the Justice Department initially for Abu Zubaydah, then for Nashiri, then for KSM, and then for a few other people. That's all I knew that was authorized. And so when I arrived at this other location and they were doing other things, it surprised me and I asked, Are these authorized? The response I got was, I don't think so, some of them might be. So I said, You can't do that, you know, they've got to be authorized. But I'm working for the CIA. The guy that is doing these things is a CIA officer under whose auspices I now am because they sent me there to do a specific job and he asked me to come and talk to Gul Rahman. So I am walking this line because I don't know what I don't know what's going on, but I know that I'm not in charge, and we'll get to that, I'm sure. I asserted myself the best I could and did what I could do. But if I may say this to you all: You you may have embarked upon this lawsuit with the best intentions possible, I don't know, but you did it with a document that's so wholly flawed and misinterpreted that you've shot yourselves in the foot, I fear, because if you even examine the SSCI document meticulously, you will see what I'm talking about. And you will also see how they tried to aim it at Jim and my heads because they thought we were demons, because they thought we had done all these terrible things. We didn't string people up by their arms, we didn't short chain them to walls until they froze to death, we didn't threaten them with drills and guns. We did exactly we did due diligence. We said, This is tough work, and we will go and do it for our country, but it has to be legal and it has to be within the bounds that's acceptable to our nation and our government, and we were told, Yes, it is, here it is. This is what you can do, this is how you can do it. If you decide you want to do anything else, you ask us. Which we did. Every single time, meticulously. And so I realize I'm becoming evangelical, I'm sorry. But that report does not reflect that. That report is distorted, that report is cherry-picked, that report was put together very effectively by people who wanted to attack me and Jim and the CIA, independently or collectively. And if you look at the rebuttal report, if you look at the CIA's rebuttal, or I mean the minority report, you'll see there is another version to be considered. So perhaps, even though this is a very distasteful experience for me to be sued by two individuals I've never met before in my entire life and had absolutely nothing to do with, and one person who I tried to save, and if they had been in my program and if they would have done what I recommended be done, he'd still be alive. But Jim and I are the culpable people. So, again, the premise is is all wrong. Some of the things did happen. They very well did happen. And they were not authorized, but we didn't do them. Thank you for listening.
Mr. Lavin: Of course. Maybe we should take a short break?
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 3:17 PM. We are now off the video record. (Recess.) The time is now 3:25 PM. We're now back on the video record.
Mr. Lavin: So did your did your participation in the Abu Zubaydah interrogation end around August 2002?
John Bruce Jessen: Did you say August?
Mr. Lavin: Yes.
John Bruce Jessen: In let me qualify. I don't remember the exact dates, but we interrogated Abu Zubaydah with the techniques for about 17 days, and there were a few days when we weren't using the techniques, when we had told them we were going to stop. But subsequent to that, I continued to work with Abu Zubaydah for years.
Mr. Lavin: Right.
John Bruce Jessen: So initially just using social influence and talking to him. Eventually, when the staff went home, they turned me into an analyst and I and I would go I would talk to him and I would go write the reports up. Then when they finally got enough people to come in to do debriefings regularly, we would coach the debriefs, teach them how to interact with the detainees, because at that point in time, we wanted to maintain the rapport that we established, and sometimes when people would come in to debrief, they would have a swagger or have an attitude that would be detrimental to them continuing talking. So we would coach them, we would watch sometimes coming in and out of the cell. But that went on for years. So it was mainly a maintenance, and in some cases, protect the detainee from everybody else in terms of, you know, keeping the environment so that they would continue to talk. So I don't know how to answer your question with a specific date.
Mr. Lavin: Right. No, and that was that was very informative. I guess, just so I'm clear on the timeline, so the the use of the techniques wraps up after a 17-day period in which several of the days there aren't actually techniques being used towards the end.
John Bruce Jessen: Correct.
Mr. Lavin: And that that period is all over in August 2002?
John Bruce Jessen: I think so, yeah. Within within 20 days of when we started, it was over with. I'm pretty sure I can say that.
Mr. Lavin: And then in September and October of 2002, were you sort of continuing in that debriefing role you were describing?
John Bruce Jessen: That's correct.
Mr. Lavin: And then and then you were called to the site where Gul Rahman and Nashiri were?
John Bruce Jessen: Nashiri wasn't there when I went there, but he did show up there.
Mr. Lavin: I see. And you were called to that site sometime around November 2002?
John Bruce Jessen: I think so.
Mr. Lavin: And just to let you know, we're going to try to avoid using any exact dates.
John Bruce Jessen: Any?
Mr. Lavin: Exact dates.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: So like I won't ask
John Bruce Jessen: That's good for me because I don't remember any.
Mr. Lavin: Oh, good. All right. Well, I'll never ask you to say, like you know, November 3rd or something.
John Bruce Jessen: All right.
Mr. Lavin: Now, we're going to talk about Gul Rahman obviously. Do you recall being interviewed after his death?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: And were you truthful in your responses at that time?
John Bruce Jessen: Was I?
Mr. Lavin: Were you truthful in your responses at that time?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: So I'd like to bring in a new exhibit, which is tab 23. Please mark this this is exhibit what?
Cody Smith: 31.
Mr. Lavin: 31. (Exhibit No. 31, Memorandum, Bates US 1047 through 1053, was marked for identification.) So for the record, the court reporter has shown Dr. Jessen Exhibit 31, which is labeled Memorandum for the record. It is US Bates 1047 to 1053. And you can take as long as you'd like to familiarize yourself with that.
John Bruce Jessen: I recognize it.
Mr. Lavin: Okay.
John Bruce Jessen: So I think we can probably proceed.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. Great. So this is appears to be an account of an interview that was done with you in January 2003. Do you remember being interviewed around that time?
John Bruce Jessen: This is what I remember: After I left Cobalt, I went to another location to work and I couldn't get home, I didn't get home until, I don't know, it was before Christmas, but whenever it was. At that time, I went directly to the most senior person I knew in CTC and told them about what my concerns were with Cobalt and with Rahman and so forth. At that time, as I later learned, Rahman was already deceased. They didn't tell me that, but I did have the occasion to discuss with them what my concerns were. Sometime after that, I was home and I received a phone call and the person identified themselves as a CIA officer, and he said, I'd like to talk to you about Gul Rahman, and I said, Is he dead? Because I had that concern. He confirmed that he was. This is what I don't remember exactly I don't know if this interview was on the phone or if I was at Langley, but it would have been shortly after the phone call if it was because I was deployed again right away. I didn't ever see this after it was typed up. I probably would have changed a few things had they allowed me to see it, but this is an account of the interview. I just don't know if it was in person or on the phone.
Mr. Lavin: Do you do you recall what you would have changed?
John Bruce Jessen: Well, I'd have to go through it line-by-line, but some of the wording and some of the syntax doesn't seem like the way I would have said it. But you know, I have no way of proving it one way or another because I didn't ever see it afterwards.
Mr. Lavin: I see.
John Bruce Jessen: I'm not asserting that well, I don't know. I just I didn't see it, so...
Mr. Lavin: Sure. So you know, you said that you thought he might be dead when when you got that phone call about Mr. Rahman?
John Bruce Jessen: That was the first thought that came in my mind.
Mr. Lavin: And why was that?
John Bruce Jessen: Because of the deplorable conditions he was in when I left.
Mr. Lavin: Could you could you describe those conditions?
John Bruce Jessen: It was cold, he was in a facility run by a CIA officer, Chief of Base, but guarded by indigenous personnel who were of a faction incredibly hostile to his faction, and in fact, they surmised that Gul Rahman had been complicit in some way with the death of their leader in the not too distant past. There was no 24/7 surveillance like there was where I had come from. So for 12 or more hours a day, the detainees were left alone with these indigenous guards. I am not aware of any mistreatment of the indigenous guards with any other detainee except Rahman, but they handled him roughly and with disdain. He was also in the conflict, as I was told by the Chief of Base. He would fight with the guards, he threw his dung and urine can at the guards. The guards had given him what were called cold showers. There's a document we have, we all have, that says I observed one of these. I don't know if I did. I know I was told about it. I was aware of it, but I don't remember specifically seeing it. I was told that it was done because there was no hot water in the facility or they had a pipe problem. I don't know if that's accurate or not. But subsequent to that, I did see Gul Rahman being taken to his cell. He was cold and shivering, and I was concerned that he would be hypothermic. And so I told the guards that they had to get him blankets and insulation. I talked to the Chief of Base and said, you know, Winter is coming on and we need to get heaters here, and he acknowledged that and said he had already started whatever the procurement process is to do that, and before I left, I did see heaters in the facility. But but they they did other things that weren't authorized. They did what they called a hard takedown, which they asked me to observe and I did, and they didn't do it in a completely out-of-control way, but it wasn't approved and it didn't seem to have any usefulness that it perhaps could have had if it's it's a technique that could definitely dislocate your expectations about what's going on, but they returned him immediately to his cell and then just left him there. So if you're going to dislocate someone's expectations then you want to go in there with your interrogation skills, social influence skills, and see if you can leverage that in some way. I made that suggestion to the officer. So that and other things were going on when I got there.
Mr. Lavin: And I think I think you described the cold shower that either you saw or became aware of
John Bruce Jessen: Right.
Mr. Lavin: through description. In this interview, you described it as a deprivation technique.
John Bruce Jessen: Uh-huh.
Mr. Lavin: Do you know what you meant by that?
John Bruce Jessen: I do. In SERE jargon, a deprivation technique is anything that disrupts the steady state, as I said earlier. So if I were to take away your Coca-Cola and you really wanted it, it would be a deprivation. If I were to take away all your clothes, that would also be a deprivation. So there are varying degrees. But I asked the site manager if if he had approval for that kind of deprivation. I don't remember specifically what he said, I'm not trying to, you know, aim this at him. It's self-evident what he did if you read the documents. But it but it was a deprivation, not one that I would have used, not one that I was sanctioned to use, not one that the Department of Justice, to my knowledge, had approved, but it was a deprivation.
Mr. Lavin: And by this point in November 2002, was there, you know, a set of techniques that you understood to have been approved by the Department of Justice?
John Bruce Jessen: Well, the techniques that we were given to use with Abu Zubaydah were the only ones that I knew of, certainly the only ones I was authorized to use. In fact, at that time only Dr. Mitchell and myself were authorized to use those things.
Mr. Lavin: And then were those techniques referred to at that time, if you know, as as enhanced interrogation techniques?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't remember. You know, those terms evolved over time. The term HVD, you know, that didn't exist when we started. The term MVD. The first I think Cobalt may have been the first I heard that term because there were another group of people there working with the Chief of Base doing interrogations, doing this stuff that we're talking about, and in fact, they did use that term because the individual they had sent me there to talk to, not Gul Rahman, but another person, they when I got there, they identified him as a MVD.
Mr. Lavin: So there was some some distinction made between him as a MVD and someone else as an HVD?
John Bruce Jessen: Eventually in the program it was a very clear distinction. And I don't know when that evolution solidified, but eventually HVDs were only the highest valued people, like KSM, and Zubaydah and Nashiri and Gul Rahman, and I'm getting old that I can't roll them off my tongue quickly. But there there was a group that were so designated. And with the exception of when I was at Cobalt for I was there for maybe two or three weeks, I don't remember, that's the only time I saw or worked with any HVDs, as they came to be known or I mean, MVDs as they came to be known. But eventually those distinctions were used all the time.
Mr. Lavin: And do you happen to know whether, after Mr. Rahman's death and after you raised the the concerns you raised about the facility at Cobalt, whether changes were made at Cobalt?
John Bruce Jessen: As I told you, before I left Cobalt, I saw heaters. The Chief of Base at that time I had a pretty amicable relationship with him. I later found out from Mr. Durham and other documents that when Gul Rahman died, he panicked and lied and tried to say that it was my fault. So I don't have the same feelings I had about him at the time. But at the time he seemed switched on, motivated, cooperative. He I told him that there were a multitude of things about Cobalt that were wrong and needed to be fixed and he was very open, and in fact, asked me to help him, and he and I compiled a list on Lotus Notes, not in a cable. That's their version of email, the CIA's version of email and he was receptive to that. I never saw him personally abuse with the exception of doing the techniques that weren't authorized, I never saw him act in an abusive way, and like I said, he seemed receptive to the suggestions I had. He also told me that and this is when I the last document we looked at that talked about all this training. When I was there, he told me that there were new interrogators being trained. I you know, the first I had heard of it, and I assumed that they would be trained and then be required to follow the same guidelines that Jim and I were following, and so my comment to him was, Well, I would wait until trained interrogators got out here to continue what you're doing. This was just before I left because, as you know, headquarters asked me to do an assessment on Gul Rahman to determine whether what they I think in the cable they did use the acronym EIT. I didn't see the cable, but I think that's what the Chief of Base said but I because I knew they were talking about the techniques specifically used where I was working, and I did that assessment and I determined that, you know, they wouldn't be useful on him. He was incredibly strong, centered, focused, an excellent resister. He took the abuse from those indigenous guards with a with an air that was very surprising. You'd say, Are you okay? And he'd say, I'm just fine. You'd say I said to him, you know, Is there anything I can get for you, would you like food, you know, do you need anything? And he said No, you know, I'm just fine. I'd show him his his own driver's license with his photograph on it and say, This is your picture and it says your name is Gul Rahman, is that your name? He said, I don't understand how that how that happened. And he would smile. He was an incredible resister. So using physical pressures on a man like that is all you do is either irritate them or push them further away from where you want them to be, so I recommended they not use them. But they were convinced that he had high level information. There was a unit at the station, which will go unnamed, that was specifically tasked with identifying, from all these people that were transiting through this location, there were a lot a lot of people went through there, and they were tasked with kind of sorting out who might be useful, who might have important information and who might not. And they told me that they thought Gul Rahman was the top of their list. Now, I don't know where I'm at.
Mr. Lavin: This was very helpful. So I just want to make sure
John Bruce Jessen: I hope for me.
Mr. Lavin: Definitely. I just want to make sure I understand sort of the way and feel free not to answer if this trespasses into classified information. I'm just trying to understand how the recommendations you make or assessments you make find their way into cables, because
John Bruce Jessen: I can tell you that.
Mr. Lavin: Sure. But I'll ask it in the form of a question to make it easier for you.
John Bruce Jessen: I may get kicked by my attorney but
Cody Smith: I can't kick you with my feet going this way.
Mr. Schuelke: He's probably going to kick me instead.
Mr. Lavin: Is it correct to say that the Chief of Base is the one who ends up writing the cables?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: And you have some kind of interaction with the Chief of Base?
John Bruce Jessen: I did. I worked with him. He asked me to help him assess Gul Rahman in terms of how he could interrogate him and get this whatever the information is they thought he had.
Mr. Lavin: So you would you would convey, you know, whatever information you were asked for and the Chief of Base would write it up
John Bruce Jessen: That's correct.
Mr. Lavin: in these cables? All right. So I'd like to look at a couple of those cables. The first one is at tab 24. (Exhibit No. 32, Cable, Eyes only - Noncompliance of Gul Rahman, Bates 1072 through 1074, was marked for identification.) So Exhibit 32 has been marked, which is United States Bates 1072 to 1074, which is a cable labeled Eyes only - Noncompliance of Gul Rahman.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: Do you recognize this document?
John Bruce Jessen: You know, I don't know if I've seen this before. If the con- the contents seems to be, you know, familiar, but I don't I don't know if I've seen this particular one.
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember advising on the creation of a cable regarding the first 48 hours of interrogation of Gul Rahman?
John Bruce Jessen: No, I don't.
Mr. Lavin: Do you remember assessing whether he had a sophisticated level of resistance training?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes, I do.
Mr. Lavin: And do you remember identifying examples of his or let me rephrase that. Did you notice things that suggested to you that he had a sophisticated level of resistance training?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Are some of those
John Bruce Jessen: I assumed he did.
Mr. Lavin: And were the reasons for for your conclusion or your assumption that he had a sophisticated level of resistance training, were some of those laid out in this cable?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes. These bullet points, at least several of them, seem consistent with my observation, and I could have, in fact, made those observations to the Chief of Base who then incorporated them in his cable. When I got there and he asked me to help him, I went and observed them interrogating Gul Rahman twice. Then he said, The agency wants you to make an assessment, so I did. I believe I did four sessions, each one would have been probably an hour or less. So that was the sum total of time I spent with Gul Rahman, except the couple of times I observed him out of the interrogation room. But the the Chief of Base, to my recollection, continued to question and interrogate him all the time that I was there.
Mr. Lavin: And when you were pointing earlier at these these bullet points in the cable, are you are you referring to the paragraph that
John Bruce Jessen: Paragraph 4, the bullet no, paragraph 4 of the bullet point, the last page of the
Mr. Lavin: And those are the bullet points labeled A through J in paragraph 4?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes. I don't know that I made all those observations, but it seems reasonable to me that I did some of them because of the judgment that I made about his resistance posture.
Mr. Lavin: And those included your judgment that he was ignoring obvious facts like the driver's license that had
John Bruce Jessen: Correct.
Mr. Lavin: his picture on it? That he was unresponsive to provocation?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know if I said that or not. I could have said that. I don't know when this was written. As part of my assessment, I used a facial slap to to determine how he would respond, as I was authorized to do, and as I suspected, he was impervious to it. He I could tell that, you know, it would be futile and gratuitous to do those things. So that possibly could have led to that bullet, but I don't know because I don't remember the sequence and the time.
Mr. Lavin: What about the "Claimed inability to think due to conditions - cold"?
John Bruce Jessen: Which one is that, which letter?
Mr. Lavin: That's C.
John Bruce Jessen: "Claimed inability to think due to conditions." I don't know what the hyphenated cold means. I didn't give him cold showers, I didn't strip him naked and hold him and hang him up in the cell naked. I didn't do those things. I didn't short chain him to the wall with no clothes. I did only what the Government had authorized me to do. But it was cold there and he didn't act like it was. So that's the best answer I can give you, Dror.
Mr. Lavin: All right. Let's let's move to the next one, which is, "Complained about poor treatment." Do you do you recall him doing that?
John Bruce Jessen: Not to me, no. He was always everything is fine when I talked to him.
Mr. Lavin: And is that also you don't recall him complaining about the violation of his human rights?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't.
Mr. Lavin: Would those would those behaviors suggest resistance training to you?
John Bruce Jessen: They would be consistent with with resistance training, yes.
Mr. Lavin: What about claiming inability to think due to cold condition?
John Bruce Jessen: Definitely.
Mr. Lavin: How would you tell the difference between someone who is actually having trouble thinking because they were cold to someone who is just claiming it as a resistance technique?
John Bruce Jessen: That's a good question. If you thought that was happening, you would call in a physician or someone to examine him and make sure that they weren't suffering in that way.
Mr. Lavin: Do you know whether anyone called in a physician for Mr. Rahman?
John Bruce Jessen: I know people asked for a physician because I asked for them and Jim asked for them multiple times. We asked for an audience of the Chief of Station and weren't given it. We talked directly to the PA that was in charge of medical care out there and told him he needed to go see Gul Rahman, and he told us that he doesn't work on fucking terrorists. Pardon my French, but that's a quote. We tried. And I continued trying when I got home.
Mr. Lavin: And when you said you you used an authorized insult slap to check his response to provocation
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: how did you come to know that that was something that was authorized for use on on Gul Rahman?
John Bruce Jessen: I'm I was authorized to use these techniques. I was asked by the CIA to assess him for their use. The only reasonable way to determine that would be to pick the least intrusive one, see how he responded, in addition to other details in terms in terms of things that I've already told you about his staunchness and resilience.
Mr. Lavin: So the way it would work was you would try out the least intrusive of the sort of physical authorized techniques, and then you would request permission if you thought you know, let me let me restart that. That's too complicated. So the way the process would work, if I'm understanding correctly, and please tell me if I'm not, is that you would take an assessment based on your exploratory use of the least intrusive technique you were authorized to use?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't agree with what you're saying.
Mr. Lavin: I'm sure I'm sure I got that wrong.
John Bruce Jessen: I was authorized to use specific techniques. I was sent to Cobalt for another reason, but while I was there, the CIA sent a cable to the Chief of Station and to the Chief of Base and said, Have him tell us whether we should use these techniques on him or not. And and so I interviewed him, I questioned him. I used the least intrusive of those techniques, I made my determination and recommended they not be used.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. That's that's a much better description than the one I asked about. So I think I think we also discussed you witnessed something called a hard takedown?
John Bruce Jessen: I did.
Mr. Lavin: Can you describe what that was?
John Bruce Jessen: You want to read it?
Mr. Lavin: Sure.
John Bruce Jessen: Or do you want me to describe it?
Mr. Lavin: I'd prefer if you described it.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay. It's been 15 years, so...
Mr. Lavin: Would you like to look at the the document to refresh
John Bruce Jessen: No, I can describe it. The Chief of Base and three or four GRS guys went precipitously into Rahman's cell, picked him up, hustled him outside and then they hollered and yelled and threw what appeared to me to be cold punches occasionally at him as they ran up and down the corridor in the detention facility. They then returned him to his cell and locked him in there.
Mr. Lavin: And you said that that was sort of a waste of a technique because they didn't talk to him afterwards?
John Bruce Jessen: What I said was, first of all, it wasn't authorized. Secondly, if they were authorized to do something like that, which I would not choose to do, to dislocate expectations, they forgot the most important part, and that was to stay with the individual and see if they could leverage that in some way to get him to talk. I don't believe they did it out of cruelty, I believe they were ignorant to the second piece that needed to be done, and I explained that to the Chief of Base. I said, If you are going to do this, if if you get this authorized, this is what I recommend to you. And again he was receptive to that.
Mr. Lavin: Do you recall whether during the time you were spending with him
John Bruce Jessen: With Gul Rahman?
Mr. Lavin: Yeah. Do you recall whether he was clothed most of the time?
John Bruce Jessen: No, he wasn't clothed all the time. I had to have him I asked them to put clothes on him on two different occasions because he was cold and asked blankets to be taken to him.
Mr. Lavin: Was he mostly wearing a diaper?
John Bruce Jessen: No, not when I saw him. He had a dishdasha, which is that ubiquitous one-piece long garment that you see in Afghanistan or you see at different places, wherever he was.
Mr. Lavin: His nationality is known. So he was wearing this garment most of the time?
John Bruce Jessen: Yup. When I interrogated him he was, yeah.
Mr. Lavin: And do you know whether he was being kept naked some of the time as well?
John Bruce Jessen: I think he was. In fact, I know he was because I saw him that way and told them to get clothes on him.
Mr. Lavin: So is it that he'd be naked between interrogations, but he'd be garbed in this dishdasha during the interrogations?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know. I told you the interaction I had with him. I didn't see him every day. I don't know.
Mr. Lavin: There's there's one one thing you that's written down in the interview summary that I wanted to ask you about. Is that Exhibit 31?
John Bruce Jessen: The interview summary. You mean when the individual interviewed me about the circumstances of his death?
Mr. Lavin: That's right.
Mr. Schuelke: That's 31.
John Bruce Jessen: I think I got it right here.
Mr. Lavin: So on just on the bottom of page 1050 and then at the top of page 1051, there's there's a paragraph that I'd like to ask you about.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: It says that you stated that: "If a detainee is strong and resilient, you have to establish control in some way or you're not going to get anywhere." Does that sound accurate?
John Bruce Jessen: That sounds like something I might have said, but I never saw this document after I gave the interview.
Mr. Lavin: Do you think that's an accurate description of I guess let me rephrase that. Sitting here today, would you agree that if a detainee is strong and resilient, you have to establish control in some way or you're not going to get anywhere?
John Bruce Jessen: This is what I agreed to: If the detainee was designated by the CIA as someone that I was supposed to interrogate and I had permission to use the authorized Department of Justice techniques on him and he was not forthcoming, then I would say that's an accurate statement.
Mr. Lavin: And it looks like the next sentence says: "If bound by the Geneva Conventions, this person would not break." Is it your impression that if you were bound by the Geneva Conventions, you would not be able to break a detainee?
John Bruce Jessen: I'm not sure I understand your question.
Mr. Lavin: It was not a well-asked question. Maybe you can just explain to me the sentence: "If bound by the Geneva Conventions, this person would not break."
John Bruce Jessen: Okay. First of all, 15 years ago, I'm not sure exactly what I said. So all I can do is speculate about what this guy and maybe I'm not supposed to speculate.
Mr. Lavin: I would certainly not
Cody Smith: Let me help you out here. That is exactly what you're not supposed to do, so if
John Bruce Jessen: Yeah. So you know, I I don't know.
Cody Smith: If you don't know what he meant by what he said, state that for the record and then we'll move on.
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know what he meant.
Mr. Lavin: Do you have any understanding today of whether detainees can be effectively interrogated within the confines of the Geneva Conventions?
Cody Smith: Objection.
John Bruce Jessen: Do I have
Mr. Lavin: Let me ask it another way. Sure. You know, we spoke a little bit about the Army Field Manual earlier.
John Bruce Jessen: Yes. Yup.
Mr. Lavin: Are you familiar with the techniques that are authorized in the Army Field Manual?
John Bruce Jessen: Generally, yeah. I don't have it memorized, but I know what's in there.
Mr. Lavin: Do you do you believe today that the Army Field Manual provides sufficient latitude for an interrogator who's looking to interrogate someone who has information?
John Bruce Jessen: If that interrogator has the right kind of person. If you look into the history of the Army Field Manual and its purpose, you'll see that it was designed, even from its inception, it's had iteration changes. It was designed to question and interrogate a field troop, one out of a thousand people captured, to narrow the field to get to the people who had the most information, and in that sense, it has been, and I'm sure remains effective on many people. The people that I was asked to interrogate, like Zubaydah and KSM and others, it would not have been effective at all.
Mr. Lavin: And do you know if the techniques in the Army Field Manual were tried on on those individuals?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know. I don't know where that comment came from.
THE REPORTER: I'm sorry, I don't know where?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know where that comment about the Geneva Conventions came from.
Cody Smith: Just for the record, Dror, what individuals are we talking about?
Mr. Lavin: That's a good question. I meant Zubaydah and KSM who you just mentioned as people who the Army Field Manual techniques would not be effective.
John Bruce Jessen: I do not believe they would be effective on those two individuals that I mentioned.
Mr. Lavin: And do you know whether they were tried on those two individuals?
John Bruce Jessen: No. I wasn't with them all the time.
Mr. Lavin: It on the same page, and again, you know, let me know if if these if these words don't make sense to you or seem inaccurate.
John Bruce Jessen: We're on
Mr. Lavin: But on but on the very bottom of the page where we were on, which was 1051?
John Bruce Jessen: The bottom of 1051, okay.
Mr. Lavin: It says: "People can go hundreds of hours with sleep deprivation and not have ill effects." Do you believe that to be true?
John Bruce Jessen: I you know, I'm not up on the literature right now. I know you can go a long, long time without and you bounce back, but I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Lavin: Do you know how Gul Rahman was deprived of sleep?
John Bruce Jessen: No, I don't. You mean how they orchestrated it so he couldn't sleep? I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Lavin: Do you have a sense of how sleep deprivation was accomplished with detainees?
John Bruce Jessen: I know how sleep deprivation was accomplished on some detainees.
Mr. Lavin: Did you know how it was accomplished on detainees at Cobalt?
John Bruce Jessen: I do not.
Mr. Lavin: Do you know how it was accomplished with Nashiri?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't remember sleep deprivation being used with Nashiri, but I was only with him for a few days.
Mr. Lavin: Why don't why don't we ask this in a different way: What methods have you seen for inducing sleep deprivation?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know if I'm allowed to tell you.
Mr. Lavin: Is that we can take a moment.
Andrew Warden: Why don't we confer on that?
Mr. Lavin: Sure.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 4:10 PM. We are now off the video record. (Recess.) We are now back on the video record. The time is 4:22 PM.
Mr. Lavin: Do you know if anyone else in the CIA was making alterations to those techniques?
John Bruce Jessen: I know that that did happen, yes.
Mr. Lavin: And how did those how did you become aware of those alterations?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know if I can tell you. (Pertinent portion of the record is read.) Okay.
Cody Smith: We're good.
Mr. Lavin: Did you become aware that someone else in the CIA made altercations to the EITs?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: And how did you become aware of that?
John Bruce Jessen: Okay. If I can get through this accurately. It's confusing because I was I was working I was sent out to do this guy, then do this guy, and then do this guy, with this specific roadmap with these specific rules, they never changed. But as that transpired, I find out I found out contemporaneously back then, years ago, and then found out even more going through these documents that you have, there were people over here working for the CIA, interrogating people, that came up with their own rules of the road. I don't know how they did it, I don't know who approved them. Some of them I heard about; some of them I discounted because I thought, Geez, you know, that may not be true, I don't know. Another group over here, I go to Cobalt, I find out there's a whole operation going on here, they've got 30, 40 people. Later I find out they're they've run a training program and they're sending interrogators out to do thing. I know nothing about it. I mean, this line and it's understandable, I guess, because they're all they're all compartments, although I think they were all under CTC. But they're compartments so I don't know what they're doing; I don't know who they're doing it to. I did find out later that some of those people came into the facilities where I had worked and interacted with people that I worked with, not when I was there. I don't know what they did to them, I don't know how long they did it. I found out subsequently that there was a whole other facility somewhere that were processing a whole bunch of what they at that time called MVD people. I didn't know anything about their program, what the rules were. I didn't help them develop it, I didn't give them suggestions, but I did eventually find out who it was, and so it was very confusing. But to try and synthesize it down to what I know, because what I know is what I was authorized to do and the people that I saw. Nothing changed in the program I was in substantively. There may have been something that the physicians wanted to tweak or something like that that I don't know about. So I'm doing CYA due diligence. There may have been little things. But in terms of what we were told to do and authorized to do, that didn't change. I only know specifically of one technique that was authorized. Not authorized for me to use where I was at, but somewhere else for someone else, and that was called water dousing, and that had gone through the channels and had receiving had received approved to be used. I didn't use it, I never saw it used, but I did know I don't know when for sure I heard that. But I'm but I'm confident that I saw either was told or saw in a document somewhere that that was an authorized technique to use on these MVDs. Which group of MVDs, which effort, I don't know. I know it might be tedious for you, but what I'm trying to communicate to you is there were all kinds of efforts going on. We were at war, we were in a running gun battle with these people, and everybody was trying to do something. I don't know if it was good or bad. I know some of it wasn't good, and I've told you about that, and the CIA had been really upfront and acknowledged all that and they took the appropriate actions and sanctioned the people who engaged in those behaviors. Although if you read the SSCI report, you would think that was me and Jim, which it wasn't. So that one that one I do feel confident about, but Lord knows what else was going on. There was a lot.
Mr. Lavin: And did you ever have to sign some documents acknowledging, you know, the scope of what was or was not permitted within the program?
John Bruce Jessen: Eventually, and I don't know when this happened either, when you would go to a location to work, there would there was a protocol. It had all the approvals, it had all of the authorizations, it had a current plan for whomever it was you were going to work on, if one had been written; if not, you had to write one. So I did see those things. That wasn't standard to start with because people were just grabbing their kit and running. But it did become a protocol. I don't know if that's what you're talking about, but I did see those.
Mr. Lavin: Just to just to turn for a moment to that time where it seemed like at least some of the EITs were going to be phased out
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: and you and Dr. Mitchell did not make the decision as to which EITs would or would not continue.
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: You said that both you said that you certainly found walling useful.
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: And I believe you said that's because it dislocates expectations?
John Bruce Jessen: I used walling for, I don't know, 17 or 18 years in training. I knew how it's discomboburating (sic). It it doesn't hurt you, but it it jostles the inner ear, it makes a really loud noise. It's safe because of the wall that you construct to do it on, and yet it sounds like it sounds pretty tremendous. And if someone is going to be dislocated in the terms that we've been talking about, that usually does it. So I did think it was effective. One of the most effective we didn't have a rating scale, but yes, I felt walling was effective.
Mr. Lavin: What about
John Bruce Jessen: It was effective on me. I went through several schools with our allies, some schools where they could do use physical pressures, some schools where for example, in the UK at that time, they couldn't use any physical pressures, but they would stand you in a tunnel on one of the moors with the rain coming through until you thought you were going to freeze to death, and you know. So I'm not new to this, and I know what's safe and I know what works, and walling is safe and it works.
Mr. Lavin: And does cramped confinement work?
John Bruce Jessen: They still use it, and I think it is useful, yes.
Mr. Lavin: What about dietary manipulation?
John Bruce Jessen: I'm not sure what you mean by that. That had different meanings in time.
Mr. Lavin: Did you have a sense of what it meant in the CIA EIT context?
John Bruce Jessen: I can tell you this: When Abu Zubaydah was waterboarded, the physicians had determined that he had had enough time since he had his rice and beans that he wouldn't throw up, but he still had some food in his stomach, and although the physicians told us he wasn't in any danger, it was disturbing to see him throw up. And they didn't want that to happen anymore. So they said, Let's use Ensure. And that, I believe, came to be identified as dietary manipulation. That's my understanding.
Mr. Lavin: So your
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know of other dietary manipulation. We fed these once they got out of the hard times, which was usually a week or two, they were fed Halal meals and fed, to the extent possible, anything that they wanted to eat. So I don't know what other meaning. But as I said to you, there were many other efforts and they may have come up with that term and used it in a way that I don't know about.
Mr. Lavin: And when you say "once they got out of the hard times," you mean the period where the EITs were applied?
John Bruce Jessen: The physical pressures.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. Let's turn to Exhibit 21, which I think we've discussed a little bit, which is the CIA's response to the Senate report.
John Bruce Jessen: I'm not going to read this whole thing right now, and I haven't read the whole thing before now, so you should direct me to where you
Mr. Lavin: So I'm going to ask you a question about page 25. So it says there: "We agree that the CIA should have done more from the beginning of the program to ensure that there was no conflict of interest"
John Bruce Jessen: Where are you at?
Mr. Lavin: I'm sorry. I'm at the second paragraph on page 25.
Mr. Schuelke: Second bullet?
Mr. Lavin: Second bullet on page 25.
John Bruce Jessen: You are? On page 25.
Cody Smith: The bullet right there.
John Bruce Jessen: Where is "we agreed"?
Cody Smith: Well, he's
Mr. Lavin: I'm sorry, I started in the middle of the sentence.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay. I'm with you now.
Mr. Lavin: Just take take a look at that sentence.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: Do you agree that you and Dr. Mitchell designed and executed the techniques?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: What's your what's your disagreement with that?
John Bruce Jessen: I didn't design anything.
Mr. Lavin: Did you and Dr. Mitchell propose the set of techniques to the CIA that was used in the EIT program?
John Bruce Jessen: I didn't propose them to the CIA. When I got to the CIA on that day in, was it June or July? In June, the show was already running, and I helped compile the list of things we had done for years and years and years, and it was a transfer of techniques and knowledge from one place to another place. Nothing was created.
Mr. Lavin: And do you agree that you played a role in evaluating the effectiveness of the techniques?
John Bruce Jessen: No.
Mr. Lavin: So the CIA was incorrect
John Bruce Jessen: I have no idea what they meant with what they said right there. I never wrote anything, I never made a a verbal presentation to anyone. I may have said they're talking, and when you're an interrogator what you want people to do is talk. But if you will look this is not an indictment of you, but if people will look what the CIA said about the information they got or what the option rebuttal said, or what the analysts on the ground said, it's a very different opinion than the opinion that's rendered in the SSCI. Nonetheless, I had nothing to do with any of those opinions.
Mr. Lavin: Did you ever assess the interrogation records of people you did not personally interrogate? So what I'm asking about is: You interrogated a number of detainees?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: There were a whole much larger number of people that the CIA detained and interrogated
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: that you did not personally interrogate?
John Bruce Jessen: Correct.
Mr. Lavin: Did you ever review any records of those interrogations that you did not personally participate in?
John Bruce Jessen: I have no recollection of doing that. I well, no, I interrogated Gul Rahman, so I looked at what they said about him, but no one else.
Mr. Lavin: So the CIA never asked you to try to make some kind of analysis of the interrogations that had been done by people besides yourself and Dr. Mitchell?
John Bruce Jessen: No, we didn't do anything like that.
Mr. Lavin: So just staying on this exhibit. If you look at 49.
John Bruce Jessen: Page 49?
Mr. Lavin: Page 49, just at the at the bullet at the very top.
John Bruce Jessen: Where are you on page 49?
Mr. Lavin: That very top bullet.
John Bruce Jessen: Top bullet. Okay.
Mr. Lavin: So would you again disagree that the agency permitted the contractors to assess the effectiveness of enhanced techniques?
John Bruce Jessen: Absolutely. I never did that. You can search 'til cows go home and you're never going to find anything like that. We didn't do it.
Mr. Lavin: And so, to the best of your knowledge, Dr. Mitchell was never involved with assessing the techniques?
John Bruce Jessen: To the best of my knowledge, no.
Mr. Lavin: And did Mitchell Jessen and Associates have any kind of contract to assess the effectiveness of enhanced techniques?
John Bruce Jessen: Not in the context that you're talking about here, no.
Mr. Lavin: What what other context?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't know. I just I'm just trying to be exclusive.
Mr. Lavin: Are you aware of any context in which Mitchell Jessen and Associates was contracted to assess the effectiveness of enhanced techniques?
John Bruce Jessen: No. I'm convinced there was none.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. Do you know whether Dr. Mitchell ever had a goal of finding and paying an independent researcher not involved in the program to assess whether it was effective?
John Bruce Jessen: No, I don't know anything about that.
Mr. Lavin: Do you prior to this lawsuit being filed, did you communicate fairly closely with Dr. Mitchell?
John Bruce Jessen: We've been friends for a long, long time, so I'm sure I communicate with him often. But when we were treated the way we were and lost our jobs, our livelihood and our reputations, we didn't spend our time sitting around talking about this damn program, I'll tell you that.
Mr. Lavin: And that's you're talking about after 2007 when it was
John Bruce Jessen: 2009.
Mr. Lavin: 2009?
John Bruce Jessen: Yup. How would you like to be sitting in I'm not going to say that. You're a good guy and you don't deserve the abuse. Never mind. Sorry.
Mr. Lavin: No. And thanks for for sitting here and answering my questions.
John Bruce Jessen: Well, I don't know that you are, but you seem to be.
Mr. Schuelke: You better move on.
Mr. Lavin: Yeah. Have you have you read Dr. Mitchell's book?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Would you say it's generally accurate?
John Bruce Jessen: I'd say it's generally accurate.
Mr. Lavin: Do you ever consider going out in public and talking about your role in the program?
John Bruce Jessen: I have considered that. It would be a very special and discreet instance, but I I have volunteered to go to the 9/11 families and talk. But it's not my nature to be in a public light, so I haven't ruled it out. I have a family. I have grandchildren. Two Christmases ago I'll tell you a story. Two Christmases ago I get a call from the CIA, my grandchildren and my daughter and son-in-law are living with us. You have 15 minutes to get out of your house because because ISIS has found someone to come to kill you and your family. Now, those that isn't the only threat I've received over the years, I've received lots of them. And I'm not afraid and I did my duty and I stood up and I went to war, and I'll stand up to any of them again, but I don't want them messing with my family. And when you stick your face in the public eye, you get people like the SSCI and Senator Feinstein and the ACLU and other people who accuse you of things you didn't do, who out your name, who give them your address, who print articles that are full of crap about you, and it makes it difficult. So why would I want to complicate my life more by going out in public when the public's already made up their mind about things? I want to protect my family. So my answer is, no, I'm very circumscribed about it, but I would go and talk to the 9/11 families.
Mr. Lavin: Just a just a couple more questions. Do you remember in the context of this lawsuit when you were asked by your attorneys to conduct a search for documents in response to that request?
John Bruce Jessen: I do.
Mr. Lavin: Did you conduct that search yourself?
John Bruce Jessen: Yes.
Mr. Lavin: Did you search any email accounts?
John Bruce Jessen: I searched everything you asked for. I turned over to my attorneys everything I had that you asked for. I did it promptly and completely.
Mr. Lavin: Did you I know I'm speaking only about the period before this lawsuit was filed. Did you have any kind of policy for retaining your email or other correspondence?
John Bruce Jessen: I don't ever keep my email more than a year. And the emails that you would be interested in were never written on my computer. They were written on CIA computers that Mr. Durham tried to open up and the CIA couldn't even open them up, so they're probably lost in perpetuity. But I didn't have Dror, I didn't have emails about work on my computer. I didn't have cryptic notes about research and the APA and this scheme that they claim people were involved in. I had none of that. I wanted as far away from that as I could get. I had enough of it. But I turned in everything I had. You have it.
Mr. Lavin: Thank you.
John Bruce Jessen: I have nothing more for you.
Mr. Lavin: I think we are almost done. I'm just going to quickly take a break, but I think we're basically there.
John Bruce Jessen: Taking a break?
Mr. Lavin: Yes, a very quick one, I hope.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 5:28 PM. We are now off the video record. (Recess.) We are now back on the record. The time is 5:50 PM.
Mr. Lavin: Sir, you've said several times today that the SSCI report is the majority report is wrong and inaccurate, and I just wanted to ask you what they got wrong.
Cody Smith: Objection.
John Bruce Jessen: We don't have time.
Cody Smith: You really want to
Mr. Lavin: Just briefly, just like some bullet points as to
John Bruce Jessen: That's an inane question.
Cody Smith: So we're clear, you're asking for just some examples?
Mr. Lavin: Yeah. I'd just like to know because, you know, Dr. Jessen has testified numerous times today that the report is inaccurate, and I just wanted to know what his objections to it were.
Cody Smith: Again, I've been quiet all day, so we're talking about the executive summary
Mr. Lavin: Yes.
Cody Smith: to some 500 pages. You want us to go through every page and tell you what we think is wrong?
Mr. Lavin: No, I don't. I was hopeful that
Cody Smith: So what do you
Mr. Lavin: I was hopeful that there could be a summary of what was wrong with it, but if that's if that's impossible to provide then
Cody Smith: Let's hear from the witness.
John Bruce Jessen: I think it would be impossible without a lot of time and patience and the document to point out all the inconsistencies and distortions and outright falsehoods, the cherry-picking, the intentional direction to defame and slime and make vulnerable to hostile forces Dr. Mitchell and myself. Like I said, there's not time.
Mr. Lavin: Okay. Anything further? I think we're done.
John Bruce Jessen: Okay.
Mr. Lavin: Thank you.
Mr. Lustberg: Jim, anything?
Cody Smith: We have no questions of the witness.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: The time is 5:52 PM. We are now off the video record. This will end Disk No. 4 and today's deposition. (Witness excused.)